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WHEN JUDGES ABANDON ANALOGY: THE PROBLEM OF
DELAY IN COMMENCING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
PHYLLIS GOLDFARB*
Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a
violent stream [it is]; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is
carried away and another comes in its place and this will be carried away as well.
Marcus Aurelius1
It is monstrous to put a man on his trial after such a lapse of
time. How can he account for his conduct so far back? If you
accuse a man of a crime the next day, -he may be enabled to
bring forward his servants and family to say where he was and
what he was about at the time; but if the charge be not preferred for a year or more, how can he clear himself? No man's
life would be safe if such a prosecution were permitted. It would
be very unjust to put him on his trial.
2
Baron Alderson
Time is not a neutral feature with respect to the quality of adversarial trials. Indeed, time can affect adversarial fact-finding in a
variety of ways. Until the close of the eighteenth century, for example, the trials of British subjects who had been taken into custody were held immediately after arraignment.' This rush to trial
disproportionately favored the prosecution because the accused
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A., Brandeis University,
1978; Ed.M., Harvard University, 1979; J.D., Yale University, 1982; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1985. I am indebted to Arthur Berney, Robert Bloom, Mark Brodin, James Doyle,
James Fellows, Ingrid Hillinger, Leonard Mandell, Zygmunt Plater, James Repetti and Alfred Yen for their assistance and helpful comments on earlier drafts. I wish to thank as well
Greg Barksdale and Caroline Oehmler for research assistance, and Dean Daniel Coquillette
for generous research support.
1. G. LONG, MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS 140 (Book IV, T 43) (1930), quoted in D.
GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIrITY 265 (1988).
2. The Queen v. Robins, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844).
3. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK. A STUDY IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 610-11 (1944), cited in Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guaranteein Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 721 (1976).
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rarely had sufficient opportunity to gather evidence and witnesses,
to prepare carefully, or to present a full defense.
Ironically, the sluggish pace of the contemporary American criminal process can accomplish the same mischief as did the speed of
British trials of an era past. Frequently, of course, arrests follow
soon after alleged offenses, and formal processing commences
within hours or days of the arrest. In a troubling minority of cases,
however, an arrest is made months or years after an alleged offense, or is not made at all, and prosecution originates via grand
jury indictment. 4 In these cases, charges are first filed after an extended period of delay, 5 for which there may be manifold explanations. These explanations may include dilatory reporting of
offenses, 6 investigatory difficulty in producing a likely offender 7 inability to apprehend a suspected offender," a standard waiting period before the next grand jury term, 9 prolonged investigation of

4. See S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 17 (1984) (citing National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standardsand Goals: Courts 11-15 (1973)). "In some situations, the accused may have no formal contact with the law until he has been indicted by a
grand jury. Following such an indictment, a court order may be issued authorizing police
officers to take the accused into custody. But these are exceptional situations." Id.
5. These delays can be of considerable length. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d
1338, 1340 (11th Cir. 1988) (eight-year delay); United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 994
(7th Cir.) (nine-year delay), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 106 (1988); United States v. Bartlett,
794 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir.) (five-year delay), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 (1986); United
States v. Coppola, 788 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1986) (five-year delay); Stoner v. Graddick,
751 F.2d 1535, 1543-47 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (nineteen-year delay); Payne v. Rees,
738 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1984) (six-year delay); Scherling v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d
493, 500, 585 P.2d 219, 223, 149 Cal. Rptr. 597, 601 (1978) (nine-year delay); People v.
Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 621, 477 P.2d 421, 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397, 399 (1970) (eleven-year
delay); Commonwealth v. Patten, 401 Mass. 20, 22, 513 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1987) (ten-year
delay); State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150, 153, 472 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1984) (fifteen-year
delay), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1026 (Wyo.) (seventeen-year delay), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). The record for longest pre-accusation
delay may reside with State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), in
which the court upheld against due process challenge an indictment issued 22 years after
the alleged offense.
6. See United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376 (lst Cir. 1979); Story, 721 P.2d at 1020.
7. See, e.g., Patten, 401 Mass. at 20, 513 N.E.2d at 689; Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 377
Mass. 682, 387 N.E.2d 559 (1979), Commonwealth v. Ward, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 37, 436
N.E.2d 439 (1982).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 688 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1982); Smith v. United
States, 414 A.2d 1189 (D.C. 1980).
9. See United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935
(1988).
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the defendant, 10 continuing investigation against co-defendants,"
the need to maintain an informant's or undercover officer's street
identity for a longer period, 2 bureaucratic inefficiency,' 3 or
bureaucratic priority. 4
Although some of these explanations are understandable, the
consequent delays in charging the suspect can pose difficulties that
go beyond inconvenience or anxiety.' The gravest danger posed by
such delay is the subversion of the system itself, the distortion of
the adversary process.' 6 This distortion results from the erosion of
evidence as the clock ticks during the pre-accusation period.

10. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Atisha, 804 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987); United States v.
Bliss, 735 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Surface, 624 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293
(8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Walker, 601 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1979); Commonwealth v.
Best, 381 Mass. 472, 411 N.E.2d 442 (1980); Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 368
N.E.2d 1181, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1977); Commonwealth v. Horan, 360 Mass. 739, 277
N.E.2d 491 (1972).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 788 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Singer, 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 982 (1979).
12. See United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones,
524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Godfrey v. United
States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
13. See United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982); United
States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v.
Walker, 601 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. See United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046
(1988); Townley, 665 F.2d at 579; United States v. King, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 925 (1977); United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mejias, 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
15. Minimizing anxiety is one of the goals of speedy trial protection. See United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
16. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972), the Supreme Court indicated that the
most severe form of prejudice that pretrial delay can create is impairment of the ability to
present a defense because such impaired ability "skews the fairness of the entire system."
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This Article examines the law of pre-accusation delay 1 7 in light
of the requirements of both adversarial fact-finding and analogical
reasoning. I contend that current law does not adequately address
the harm generated by pre-accusation delay, and that other doctrinal choices more responsive to the problem and more protective of
the adversary process are available to the courts.
Further, the Article suggests that the judicial doctrine chosen in
pre-accusation delay cases does not represent a true application of
analogical reasoning processes. Rather, it represents a failure to
use such reasoning processes in a conventional manner. Therefore,
the law of pre-accusation delay provides fertile ground for cultivating insight into the actual processes of practical legal reasoning.
The goal of the Article is two-fold: to improve current legal analysis of the charging delay problem, and to use the charging delay
problem to enhance our general understanding of the internal
workings of American legal culture.
Section I illustrates and describes the contours of the charging
delay problem. Section II surveys the prevailing constitutional
analysis of the problem, as shaped over the past two decades by
the Supreme Court and elaborated by lower courts. Section III reviews a variety of alternative doctrinal analyses that the courts
could have developed to address the problem, followed in Section
IV by an assessment of the merits of these analyses and their fit
with traditional representations of analogical reasoning processes.
Section V develops a likely explanation of the abandonment of
traditional analogical reasoning in charging delay cases and evaluates its impact on systemic legitimacy. Finally, Section VI proposes
the expansion of traditional analogical reasoning in the interest of
generating ideas about practicable alternatives to categorical legal
analysis.

17. The terms "pre-accusation delay," "pre-charge delay," "charging delay," and "preindictment delay" are used interchangeably in this Article. Although "pre-indictment delay"
is the most common denomination of the phenomenon described, it is technically the least
accurate of the labels because a person can be charged via complaint or information prior to
the issuance of the indictment. See S. SALTZBURG, supra note 4, at 17-23 (citing National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Courts 11-15 (1973))
(describing the steps in the criminal process). Therefore, I have shown a preference in this
Article for the other labels, although all are intended to describe the same set of
circumstances.
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I.
A.

THE CHARGING DELAY PROBLEM

8
Illustration'

The telephone rings in your law office. The clerk of the court is
calling, informing you that you have been appointed to a criminal
case in which the client will be arraigned today. The original grand
jury indictment charges your client with armed assault. You report
to the court, read the indictment and the police report, and meet
with your client. You learn the following:
The police report alleges that your client, while driving a car,
pointed a gun at another driver, an undercover police officer. The
offense allegedly occurred on a crowded residential street on a
warm day sixteen months ago. Your client was not arrested until
she was taken into custody today on the indictment warrant. The
primary evidence against her is a photo identification that the
complaining witness made on the day of the incident.
You speak to your client. She reports that she was not involved
in the incident alleged. During the preceding sixteen months, the
authorities gave her no notice whatsoever that she was a suspect in
the case. She lives in the neighborhood in which the charged incident occurred and recalls vaguely that she heard several people in
the neighborhood talking some time ago about an incident similar
to that alleged, although she cannot recall their identities. She believes that witnesses to the incident may live in her neighborhood,
and that they may be able to verify her non-involvement.
Your client also informs you that although she is employed now
and living on her own, she was between jobs at the time of the
incident and living with her family. She thinks that on the day of
the offense, she was probably searching for work because that was
what she was doing virtually every day during that time period.
She also thinks that had she been notified promptly of the importance of the underlying date, she would have been able to reconstruct more specifically her activities and whereabouts than memory allows today. She believes as well that the family members
with whom she lived would have been able to corroborate her ac18. If this example sounds strange, it is a strangeness borne of reality. The narrative recited closely parallels a case that I litigated. See United States v. Jenkins, Crim. No. F-526883 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 1984).
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count. At this point, however, they will likely be unable to recall
her conduct of a day long past.
With this information in hand, you contact an investigator to
accompany you on a door-to-door canvass of the neighborhood in
which the charged offense occurred. You want to do this immediately because so much time has already elapsed since the charged
offense. Your investigation succeeds in locating some witnesses.
But when asked to discuss sixteen-month-old events, the witnesses
provide information that is conclusory at best and devoid of detail.
No one remembers seeing your client at the scene of the incident.
Although these witnesses may have once supported the position
that your client was misidentified as a participant, their present
memories lack specificity. One of the witnesses indicates that in
addition to the passage of time, a head injury she suffered in a
recent car accident has contributed to the deterioration of her
memory.
In the course of your investigation, you also learn about the existence of others who are believed to have had information about the
alleged offense. For example, several persons with whom you spoke
believe that someone who formerly lived in the neighborhood is the
principal witness to the underlying incident. She has moved out of
town, however, and no one knows where she currently resides. Had
you been able to contact her at an earlier date, you would have
arranged for this witness to leave a forwarding address with you so
that she might be reached to serve as a witness at trial. Another
person reports that she once overheard a neighborhood resident
speaking of the alleged offense as if he were knowledgeable about
it. Unfortunately, this man died recently.
You are frustrated by the failure of your investigative efforts and
feel acutely the effect of a lengthy charging delay on your ability to
mount a defense on your client's behalf. The difficulty of your job
has multiplied, as has the risk to your client, by virtue of the government's taking so long to secure an indictment. You begin to
consider legal strategies. Surely, you believe, there must be some
proscription against charging a case at such a leisurely pace that
its defense is undermined. You research the law of pre-indictment
delay and decide to file a motion to dismiss the indictment due to
unreasonable and prejudicial delay.
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B. Description
In a system that relies on retrospective reconstruction of complex events,1 9 delay at any stage of the criminal process can erode
information of evidentiary significance through memories dimmed,
witnesses gone and artifacts lost.2 0 Delay at the pre-accusation
phase represents the sharpest threat to the fact-finding integrity of
the criminal process because the opportunity to preserve sources of
evidence never arises. Suspects who werenot arrested, questioned,
or in any way notified that they would later be called to account
for specific acts alleged to have occurred at a specific time are
thereby precluded from taking steps to preserve potential evidence
from gradual and inevitable diminution over time.21 If put on notice, defendants-to-be might ask potential witnesses to make notes
of their observations of particular events, arrange to keep track of
the whereabouts of witnesses, secure physical evidence, or record
their own and others' recollections when memories are fresh. Without notice, however, these preservative measures are unavailable.2 2
19. For an analysis of the problems and hazards of accurate fact-finding at trial, see generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1988) (defendant
claimed memory failure and inability to locate witnesses); United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d
1338 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant claimed unavailability of two witnesses, death of government agent testifying for defense and destruction of important evidence); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.) (defendant claimed witness had memory loss), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 158 (1988); United States v. Acevedo, 842 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1988) (defendant claimed
memory impairment and inability to locate witnesses); United States v. L'Allier, 838 F.2d
234 (7th Cir. 1988) (defendant claimed memory loss for himself and witnesses); United
States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1987) (defendant claimed death of two key witnesses
and loss of records), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920
(6th Cir. 1986) (defendant claimed memory loss for himself and witnesses), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1067 (1987); United States v. Royals, 777 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant claimed
inability to locate investigative file); United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir.
1980) (defendant claimed loss of witness), rev'd, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. Elsbery,
602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.) (defendant claimed some witnesses had become antagonistic and
others' memories had dimmed), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979).
21. Based on experimental findings, psychologists have graphed a "forgetting" curve, indicating that memory drops off sharply within a short time after an event. See, e.g., H.
EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 62-80 (Dover ed. 1964) (originally
published 1885), cited in E. LoFTus & J. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
71 (1987); see also Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q.
391, 392-93 (1933).
22. In Tolliver v. United States, 378 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1977), which rejected a due process
challenge to eighteen months of pre-indictment delay, the court based its holding on the
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In some circumstances, pre-accusation delay may cause the prosecution to suffer attrition of evidence. For example, if the delay
has resulted from dilatory reporting, the prosecution will not have
had the opportunity to take steps to preserve its sources of evidence. Such delay can benefit the defense and may even result in
dismissal of the charges when the prosecutor determines that the
remaining evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. 23
On the other hand, in cases such as the illustration provided in
Section IA, time operates as a defendant's nemesis. The state, having embarked on an investigation when a criminal incident first
comes to light, can safeguard its case by taking preservative measures unavailable to the defense.2 4 The upshot of this, according to
Justice Douglas, is that during the period prior to formal accusation, "the State may proceed methodically to build its case while
the prospective defendant proceeds to lose his.' ' 25 Given the disproportionate adversarial advantage that, according to some ob-

fact that the government had arrested appellant within one month of the offense and had
contacted him several times prior to the indictment. These factors, the court stated, suggested that the appellant "was clearly on notice that he was accused in the case and that he
was aware at an early point after the offense that he would need an explanation of his
whereabouts on the day of the offense." Id. at 681.
23. Whether the impairment of the prosecution's case helps or hurts a defendant will vary
with the circumstances. Generally, defendants raising claims of prejudicial pre-accusation
delay may not rely on the impaired memories of prosecution witnesses as proof of prejudice
suffered. See, e.g., United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 214 (1st Cir. 1985) (no due process
violation when prosecution witnesses suffered memory lapses); United States v. Snyder, 668
F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). This result is surprising
because the memory loss of a prosecution witness can impair cross-examination, which Wigmore called "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE.
EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). Without effective cross-examination, the defendant's confrontation clause protection may be weakened. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
Witnesses against him ....").The presentation of a defense occurs through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses as well as through direct examination of defense witnesses. See
generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1978). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to link the right to present a defense to effective cross-examination of a memoryimpaired prosecution witness. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
24. As the court said in United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 844 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
"We have recognized that the inability of an accused or his witnesses to recall past events in
detail can affect credibility insofar as the jury must contrast general denials with detailed
testimony by police officers whose memories are refreshed by notes or other records."
25. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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servers, the prosecution already enjoys,2 6 time becomes an even
heavier thumb on the scales, undermining trust in the accuracy
and fairness of case outcomes. This specter of distorted fact-finding turns the phenomenon of bureaucratic heel-dragging into a
problem of constitutional dimensions.

II.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court

Although statutes of limitation provide the traditional protection against delay-related hardships to the defense,2 8 the Supreme
26. See generally Goldstein, The State and the Accused. Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
27. See, e.g., Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism,66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957) (examining the values that ground the constitutional
concept of procedural due process). The author states:
The various procedural safeguards traditionally demanded in the name of due
process appear to be directed to two objectives. One is the goal of insuring the
reliability of the guilt-determining process-reducing to a minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished. It is not of crucial importance whether the individual tried is in fact guilty or innocent, but it is of
crucial concern that the integrity of the process of ascertaining guilt or innocence never be impaired. If in this effort to insure that none but those guilty be
convicted, many guilty go free, the price is not too great in the long view of
democratic government. If there is any consideration basic to all civilized procedures it is this, no matter how disparate the means chosen to give it effect.
Id. at 346.
28. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). The purposes of statutes of
limitation are to protect persons from having to defend themselves against charges obscured
by time and to encourage officials to commence expeditious prosecutions. See Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970). The Supreme Court has indicated that criminal
statutes of limitation should be construed liberally in the defendant's favor. United States v.
Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968) (citing United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)).
Every jurisdiction has statutes of repose or limitation barring prosecutions unless charges
are filed within a stated period after the offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982) (providing a five-year statute of limitation for non-capital offenses); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 277, § 63
(1955 & Supp. 1989) (providing a ten-year statute of limitation for serious felonies, specifically listed); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 136, § 9 (1962) (providing a six-month statute of limitation
for certain "blue laws").
Even though statutes of limitation pose an outside limit on filing indictments, they do not
pose an outside limit on informing defendants that they have been charged. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4) authorizes sealing timely filed indictments until the defendant is
in custody. The purpose of the rule is to minimize the risk that knowledge of the issuance of
an indictment would enable the defendant to avoid arrest. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d
1041, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984 (1981). But if the defendant can show
"substantial actual prejudice" due to the delay in unsealing the indictment, it must be dis-
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Court has established that these statutes do not occupy the entire
field of defendants' rights with respect to protracted charging delays.29 In the 1971 case United States v. Marion,30 the Court suggested that the due process clause of the fifth amendment provides
an additional layer of protection.3 1 Although the Court subsequently assured us that the due process clause has "a limited role
to play in protecting against oppressive delay,

' s2

the holding itself

was virtually unavoidable once the fairness of proceedings, the underlying due process concern, was implicated by protracted delay. 3
In United States v. Lovasco, 4 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of pre-accusation delay once again. Examining the role of due
process in protecting against the hazards of pre-indictment delay,
the Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of an indictment filed
eighteen months after a criminal offense occurred.35 Although the
trial court had found that the eighteen-month delay prejudiced the
defendant,"8 the Supreme Court stated, in essence, that proof of
prejudice is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing due process infirmities.3 7 Instead, the Court established a twopart inquiry focusing on both defense prejudice and prosecutorial
motive. 8 In fact, the Court's language suggested that proof of
prejudice was, in effect, a standing requirement for raising the due
process issue: "[Although] proof of actual prejudice makes a due
process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication

. .

.[it does not]

make the claim automatically valid," and the reasons for the delay
39
must be considered.

missed. See Srulowitz v. United States, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853
(1987); United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1066 (1986); Muse, 633 F.2d at 1043; United States v. Davis, 598 F. Supp. 453, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
29. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
30. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
31. See id. at 324.
32. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).
33. See Kadish, supra note 27.
34. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
35. Id. at 784.
36. See id. at 787. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had affirmed this finding
of fact. United States v. Lovasco, 532 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1976).
37. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 789.
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Despite silence in the trial court record was silent as to the government's reasons for delay,40 the Supreme Court accepted the
representations made in the government's Eighth Circuit briefs
that "the delay was caused by the government's efforts to identify
persons in addition to respondent who may have participated in
the offenses."4 ' Although the seventeen months of additional investigation had produced no results, the Court characterized this
lack of success as a "fortuity" of no legal consequence." Substituting an explanation of investigative delay for the district court's
finding that no reason justified the delay, the Supreme Court held
that, despite a showing of delay-related prejudice, good faith investigation did not deprive a defendant of due process. 43 The Court
did not balance the degree of prejudice against the reasons for the
delay because a finding of good faith investigative delay terminated the constitutional inquiry. The majority provided no further
guidance as to the legitimacy of non-investigative reasons for
delay. 4
Apparently, a series of policy arguments endorsed in the opinion
influenced the holding in Lovasco. The majority observed that requiring prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists,
but before they can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
would create the risk of a number of deleterious consequences, including the filing of unwarranted charges, extension of the burdens
of the formal pre-trial period, evaporation of potentially fruitful
sources of information before they are fully exploited, and the use
of limited court resources on cases that prove insubstantial or encompass only some of the charges or defendants involved.45
The Court argued further that requiring the filing of charges
once the state gathered evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt would pose related problems. 46 First, such a rule
might impair the prosecutor's ability to continue the investigation,

40. Id. at 796.
41. Id. (quoting Petition for Certiorari at 14).
42. Id. at 795 n.16.
43. Id. at 796.
44. Id. at 797.
45. Id. at 791-92 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
46. Id. at 792.
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especially if the case involved multiple defendants and offenses.4 7
If the prosecutor could obtain subsequent indictments in such
cases, multiple trials might be needed even though the cases were
based on a single set of facts. 48 Second; the point at which prosecutors have gathered enough evidence to support a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and prosecutors might feel pressured to resolve
doubtful cases in favor of filing early charges, some of which might
prove unwarranted. 49 Finally, requiring prosecutions to commence
once prosecutors have assembled sufficient evidence would inhibit
the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in assessing whether commencing prosecution is in the public interest.6 0
Surprisingly, the Court did not discuss what is perhaps the
strongest policy argument in support of its holding: the relationship between extended pre-accusation investigation and the quality of fact-finding at trial. The prosecution's interest in private investigation for developing facts is protected by a prosecutor's
ability to delay formal charging. To the extent that good fact-gathering depends on such confidentiality, pre-accusation delays can
improve the quality of the adversarial process.
B. Federal Courts of Appeals
The Supreme Court has not returned to the issue of pre-accusation delay since Lovasco;51 hence state courts and lower federal

47. Id. at 792-93.
48. Id. at 793.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 794 (citing ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.9 n.9 (1971)).
51. Not that they have not been asked. Although the issue has been presented to the
Court on numerous occasions, the Court has consistently declined to address it. See, e.g.,
Hoo v. United States, 825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1035 (1988); Moran
v. United States, 759 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S 1102 (1986); Hollingsworth Oil Co. v. United States, 782 F.2d. 1044 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820
(1986); Ohio v. Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150, 472 N.E.2d 1097 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084; Story v. Wyoming, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986).
At least one justice believes the Supreme Court should return to the issue of pre-accusation delay. Dissenting from denial of certiorari in Hoo v. United States, Justice White wrote:
The issue presented by this petition for certiorari is what is the correct test for
determining if prosecutorial preindictment delay amounts to a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . . The continuing conflict
amongst the Circuits on this important question of constitutional law requires
resolution by this Court; I would grant certiorari.
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courts have been responsible for the development of the law in this
area. 52 Over the past dozen years, lower courts have fashioned a
range of standards, within the contours of Lovasco, by which the
due process inquiry is conducted. An examination of the decisions
in the various federal appellate circuits illustrates the manner in
which courts have conducted the due process analysis of pre-accusation delay.
Since 1977, all federal circuits have required, at mininum, a
showing of "actual prejudice" before upholding a claim that preaccusation delay has offended due process. 53 The burden of estab-

lishing prejudice is, logically, on the defendant, who holds the information regarding the nature of, and the extent to which, delay

Hoo, 484 U.S. at 1035.
52. This is as the Supreme Court intended. As Justice Marshall wrote in Lovasco, 431
U.S. at 796-77:
In Marion, we conceded that we could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions. [citation omitted] More than five years later, that statement remains
true. . . . We therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task
of applying the settled principles of due process that we have discussed to the
particular circumstances of individual cases.
53. See United States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir.) (death of witnesses and
faded memories of other witnesses insufficient showing of prejudice), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
174 (1988); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1988) (loss of potential witnesses was insufficient showing of prejudice); United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d
1110, 1114 (10th Cir. 1988) (memory failure and inability to locate witness was not actual
prejudice); United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1988) (unavailability
of two witnesses, death of government agent testifying for defense and destruction of evidence constitute actual prejudice); United States v. Thornberg, 844 F.2d 573, 580 (8th Cir.)
(no relief when defendant did not specify how he was prejudiced), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2913 (1988); United States v. Acevedo, 842 F.2d 502, 505 (1st Cir. 1988) (memory impairment and inability to locate witnesses not sufficient prejudice); United States v. Ismaili, 828
F.2d 153, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1987) (death of two witnesses and loss of records insufficient showing of prejudice), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920,
928-29 (6th Cir. 1986) (memory loss insufficient showing of prejudice), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1067 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 1986) (memory impairment not sufficient showing of actual prejudice); United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258,
263-65 (4th Cir. 1980) (loss of witness and passage of time deemed sufficient prejudice),
rev'd, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir.) (antagonistic
witnesses, memory loss and inability to recoup financial losses not actual prejudice), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 969-70 (D.C. Cir.)
(death of witness and loss of records insufficient -howing of prejudice), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 924 (1976).
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has impaired his or her capacity to present a defense.5 4 Most circuits address the prejudice question first, requiring that the trial
court find proof of actual prejudice as a threshold matter, and turn
to the question of justification only if -that threshold is crossed.5
The threshold is high, as many courts acknowledge.5 6 A defendant must establish not just the impairment of a defense because of
missing evidence, but also the availability of that evidence but for
the delay, 57 and its exculpatory nature were it now available. 58 This

54. See, e.g., United States v. Swacker, 628 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980); Elsbery, 602
F.2d at 1059; United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Price, 165
Cal. App. 3d 536, 542, 211 Cal. Rptr. 642, 646 (1985).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 863 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 2105 (1989); Comosona, 848 F.2d at 1114; Benson, 846 F.2d at 1342; United States v.
Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 995 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 106 (1988); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 158 (1988); Acevedo,
842 F.2d at 505; Atisha, 804 F.2d at 928; United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977).
In United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017
(1988), and Ismaili, 828 F.2d at 167, the Third Circuit first addressed the government's
reasons for delay before examining whether the delay had prejudiced the appellant. "Because they clearly failed to show intentional delay, we need not reach the question whether
appellants have met the burden of showing actual prejudice." Sebetich, 776 F.2d at 430. But
in United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196
(1985), the Third Circuit required a showing of actual prejudice before considering the reasons for delay.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1102 (1986); Payne v. Rees, 738 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Tiemens, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984);
United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 872 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Capone, 683
F.2d 582, 589 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Farber, 679 F.2d 733, 734 (8th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); Elsbery, 602 F.2d at 1059; Pollack, 534 F.2d at
969; United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975
(1972).
57. See, e.g., Capone, 683 F.2d at 589; United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 304-05 (9th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Elsbery, 602 F.2d at 1059; United States v. Walker, 601 F.2d 1051,
1055-57 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Richburg, 478 F. Supp. 535 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)
(mem.).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 213-14 (1st Cir. 1985) (no prejudice
when prior testimony of unavailable witness was of little probative value); Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1544-45 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (no prejudice when testimony of
witness would have been inadmissible hearsay); United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 176
(7th Cir. 1984) (death of witness was prejudicial only if witness would have testified, withstood cross-examination and been found credible by jury); Solomon, 688 F.2d at 1179 (no
prejudice when testimony of unavailable witness would have contradicted sworn affidavit);
United States v. Surface, 624 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1980) (mere claim that unavailable wit-
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showing must be "non-speculative," requiring, for example, that a
defendant establish credibly the content of a witness' testimony if
the witness had lived, had remained accessible or had a memory
unobscured by time." A defendant cannot establish simply that
the witness would have been available, but must show that the witness' testimony would have been available-for example, that the
witness could have supplied admissible evidence and was not protected by, or would not have invoked, a privilege against self-incrimination or any other testimonial privilege.6 0

ness "might be able to clear defendant of the charges" does not establish actual prejudice);
United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1979) (no prejudice when no showing of
content of forgotten testimony), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v.
D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1978) (no prejudice when no showing of how unavailable testimony would have aided defendants' cause), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978) (lost opportunity for jurors to
observe demeanor of witness is only speculative prejudice); Commonwealth v. Patten, 401
Mass. 20, 22, 513 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1987) (missing evidence was as likely to have been inculpatory as exculpatoy); Commonwealth v. Best, 381 Mass. 472, 486, 411 N.E.2d 442, 450-51
(1980) (record indicates that potential witness would not have been helpful); Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 682, 689, 387 N.E.2d 559, 564 (1979) (no showing that witness would have exculpated defendant); Commonwealth v. Horan, 360 Mass. 739, 742, 277
N.E.2d 491, 493 (1972) (two of three unavailable witnesses would not have been helpful to
defense).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (no indication
that potential witness would have testified for defendant); United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d
1156, 1163 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant failed to state the expected testimony of specific
unavailable witnesses), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985); Williams, 738 F.2d at 176 (defendant must show that unavailable witness would have testified, withstood cross-examination and been found credible); United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 1983)
(defendant failed to show the particular facts to which witnesses would have testified);
United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.) (defendant failed to identify witnesses by
true name, relate the substance of their testimony, or make efforts to locate them), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981); United States v. Toussant, 619 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (defendant did not show what evidence had become unavailable due to delay);
Walker, 601 F.2d at 1057 (no showing of what witnesses were unavailable or what their
testimony would be); United States v. Ramos Algarin, 584 F.2d 562, 567 (lst Cir. 1978)
(possibility that unavailable witness might provide additional information is speculative).
60. See, e.g., Wallace, 848 F.2d at 1470 (potential witness may have invoked privilege
against self-incrimination); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1987) (assertion that potential witness, if still alive, would have exonerated defendant by implicating
himself was naive speculation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046 (1988); Stoner, 751 F.2d at 1545
(testimony of potential witness who died would have been inadmissible hearsay); Capone,
683 F.2d at 589 (no showing that indicted co-conspirator would have waived his fifth
amendment right not to testify).
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Few defendants have been able to muster the requisite proof to
clear this initial hurdle. Consequently, in some jurisdictions, the
mechanics of the due process inquiry subsequent to the evaluation
of actual prejudice are underdeveloped.1 Some courts, however,
have found sufficient prejudice to trigger the second prong of the
Supreme Court's due process test-the reason for the delay.2
Moreover, in an effort to demonstrate more fully the correctness of
their holding, some courts have addressed the proffered explanations for delay despite a defendant's failure to establish actual
prejudice.6 3 Therefore, we have some indication of judicial views of
the entire due process analysis of pre-accusation delay, although
these views are by no means uniform.
In United States v. Marion,64 the Supreme Court accepted in
dictum the government's concession that intentional prosecutorial
delay transgresses due process strictures when the delay is under61. See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo, 842 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Atisha, 804 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987); Otto, 742 F.2d at
104; Solomon, 688 F.2d at 1171; United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); Elsbery, 602 F.2d at 1054; United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Benson, 846 F.2d at 1342 (unavailability of two witnesses, death of government agent testifying for defense and destruction of evidence was sufficient prejudice);
Mills, 704 F.2d at 1557 (lack of access to testimony of a confessor genuinely prejudiced
defense preparation), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); United States v. Lindstrom, 698

F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1983) (death of two key defense witnesses was prejudice sufficient
to trigger examination of the reasons for delay); United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1143
(8th Cir. 1982) (death of witness who could have given exculpatory evidence constitutes
sufficient prejudice); Walker, 601 F.2d at 1057 (unavailability of witness and inconvenience
to defense in conducting investigation constitutes moderate prejudice); United States v.
Glist, 594 F.2d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir. 1979) (sufficient prejudice and poor government preparation led to dismissal of charges); Shaw, 555 F.2d at 1299 (inability to locate two witnesses
and inaccessibility of equipment and records support finding that defendant was somewhat
prejudiced).
63. See, e.g., Adams, 834 F.2d at 633 (delay caused by limited resources and manpower,
and need to prioritize this prosecution relative to others); United States v. Johnson, 802
F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 1986) (delay was result of legitimate government concern for the
safety and confidentiality of its undercover informants); United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d
1285, 1293 (8th Cir.) (delay caused by uncertainty as to whether federal or state court was
proper jurisdiction for prosecution), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 (1986); United States v.
Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988) (delay was
result of mix-up between federal and state authorities); Williams, 738 F.2d at 175 (delay
was an oversight caused by case overload and administrative error); D'Andrea, 585 F.2d at
1356-57 (delay caused by death of FBI agent in charge of investigation).
64. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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taken for the purpose of gaining tactical advantage over a defendant who thereby suffers prejudice. 5 The precise language of the
portion of the opinion discussing intentional tactical delay indicates that the Court was not describing the standard for due process violations in this context. Because the appellee had claimed
neither actual prejudice nor intentional delay, the Court expressly
declined to elaborate a standard. Instead, it provided an illustration of one egregious situation that such a standard would likely
proscribe.6 6 In other words, the Court was establishing the due process ceiling to the problem. Several circuits, however, have fixed
the ceiling and the floor in identical locations, requiring both actual prejudice and intentional tactical delay as the minimum show67
ing for a due process violation.
The Lovasco opinion expanded the short list of impermissible
government reasons for delay. According to the Court, both intentional tactical delay and reckless disregard of known circumstances
indicating that delay would harm the defense offended due process
principles. 8 Even if we view the latter not as an addition, but as
the passive equivalent of the former, a few other courts clearly
have expanded the list of impermissible reasons for government

65. Id. at 324.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1988); Benson, 846 F.2d at
1343; Acevedo, 842 F.2d at 504; Ismaili, 828 F.2d at 166-67; United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d
667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1035 (1988); United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843 (1987); United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 917 (1987); Jenkins, 701 F.2d at
854.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits both have recent precedents requiring that the defendant
show actual prejudice and intentional tactical delay before finding a due process violation.
See, e.g., United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Scott,
795 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). Both circuits acknowledge, however, some conflicts on
the issue among cases within the circuit. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 229
n.16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); United States v. Hollins, 811 F.2d 384,
387-88 (7th Cir. 1987).
68. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795 n.17 (1977). "A due process violation
might also be made out upon a showing of prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard
of circumstances, known to the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable
risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense." Id. (quoting Brief
for United States at 32-33).
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delay. Drawing on tort notions of fault, the Second,69 Ninth ° and
Tenth Circuits"' have suggested that government negligence may
be an impermissible reason for protracted delay that prejudices the
defense. Through negligent delay, the courts reason, the government breaches its duty to defendants to initiate prosecutions with
reasonable expedition. Consequently, the government must bear
the responsibility for that delay. Despite the force of this argument, few jurisdictions are willing to allocate the costs of negligent
processing to the government. Most courts let the costs of the government's negligence rest where they fall, with the defendant prevailing only upon a showing of official bad faith. 2
The Fifth, 73 Sixth,7 4 Eighth,75 Ninth, 6 Tenth7 7 and Eleventh
Circuits7 a have allocated to the defendant the burden of establish-

ing improper reasons for the delay, despite the prosecution's exclusive access to the information necessary to make such a showing.
The Seventh Circuit is divided on the issue; some cases place the
burden of showing improper reasons on the defendant, 79 but others

69. The Second Circuit has neither recognized nor foreclosed negligence as an impermissible reason. United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 105 n.l (2d Cir. 1982).
70. United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102
(1986); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Simmons,
536 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1976).
71. Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 856; United States v. Glist, 594 F.2d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. See supra note 67.
73. United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 549 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 949
(1987).
74. United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067
(1987); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937
(1977).
75. United States v. Savage, 863 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2105 (1989); United States v. Sims, 779 F.2d 16, 17 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bliss,
735 F.2d 294, 301 (8th Cir. 1984).
76. United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103
(1977).
77. Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 259 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936 (1986);
United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751, 758 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984);
United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815, 817 (10th Cir. 1978).
78. United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933 (1986).
79. See United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 175 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing split
but avoiding resolution of the issue by holding that defendant had failed to show prejudice);
United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring defendant to prove
improper motive for delay).
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maintain that once the defendant establishes prejudice, the burden
shifts to the government to show legitimate reasons for the delay."
Those cases that employ burden-shifting after a defendant's prima
facie showing of prejudice generally employ balancing as well,
weighing the prejudice to the accused against the reasons for the
delay. The Fifth, s ' Seventh,82 Eighth, 83 Ninth 4 and Tenth Circuits8

5

all rendered decisions endorsing a balancing approach to

the due process question once the defendant establishes both delay-related prejudice and impermissible reasons for delay. Presumably, even in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, balancing jurisdictions
that find negligent delay impermissible, the doctrine permits a
court to vindicate the government in a case involving negligent delay and moderate prejudice, when the severity of the prejudice
does not override the culpability of the explanation."
The balancing process accords special weight to investigative delay. No appellate court has permitted the dismissal of an indictment following a finding-sometimes on the government's bare assertion-of a protracted period of good faith investigative delay
even when the defendant shows actual prejudice.8 This result is in
keeping with Lovasco, if one interprets Lovasco as respecting the
absolute justifiability of investigative delay no matter what havoc
80. United States v. Solomon, 688 F.2d 1171, 1179 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating court will balance reasons asserted by the government against the prejudice shown by the defendant);
United States v. King, 593 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
81. United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1063 (1978).
82. Solomon, 688 F.2d at 1179.
83. United States v. Savage, 863 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2105 (1989); United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 982
(1979).
84. United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102
(1986); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1980).
86. Mays, 549 F.2d at 678; see State v. Boseck, 45 Wash. App. 62, 67, 732 P.2d 1182,
1185-86 (1986) (delay to obtain testimony of incriminating witness held to be sufficient justification to overcome assumed prejudice against defendant).
87. United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant produced
no evidence to show that delay was a deliberate tactical maneuver by the government);
United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977) (need for investigation and allocating prosecutorial resources was not a deviation from fair play).
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it wreaks on the defense." One can read Lovasco more flexibly,
however, as supporting a notion that investigative delay offends
due process only when defendants, unlike Lovasco himself, can
show substantial prejudice. No court has explored the distinction
between the "moderate prejudice" suffered by Lovasco and a more
severe form of prejudice suffered as a result of good faith investigative delay.
Within this doctrinal framework, courts have found constitutionally acceptable other reasons beyond investigative delay despite
claims of defense impairment, either because the reasons outweighed the impairment or were legitimate in their own right. Examples of such reasons are: government counsel's failure to resolve
scheduling conflicts with police officers, 89 shortages among law enforcement personnel,90 prioritizing investigative efforts,9" budget
limitations, 92 case overload,"94 administrative error, 4 lack of diligence in pursuing an investigation,95 unwillingness to file charges
until a witness was tested before the grand jury,9 6 waiting for an
97
incompetent minor witness to become mature enough to testify,

awaiting an imminent scientific advance for purposes of testing forensic evidence,98 awaiting the outcome of a state prosecution
88. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) ("We therefore hold that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if
his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.").
89. United States v. Peters, 434 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.D.C. 1977).
90. United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 632
(1988); United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010
(1982); United States v. Ramos Algarin, 584 F.2d 562, 567 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
King, 560 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977).
91. United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1984); Townley, 665 F.2d at
582; King, 560 F.2d at 129-30; Shaw, 555 F.2d at 1298.
92. Adams, 834 F.2d at 633; King, 560 F.2d at 129:
93. Williams, 738 F.2d at 175; Townley, 665 F.2d at 582.
94. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 429 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1017 (1988); Williams, 738 F.2d at 175.
95. United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1144 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Walker,
601 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1979).
96. Walker, 601 F.2d at 1057.
97. People v. Price, 165 Cal. App. 3d 536, 544, 211 Cal. Rptr. 642, 648 (1985).
98. People v. Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 620-21, 641-43, 477 P.2d 421, 423, 438-39, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 397, 399, 414-15 (1970).
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before bringing federal charges,9 9 a prosecutor's honeymoon,1 0 0
confusion as to the appropriate charge and venue,10° avoiding a
grant of immunity to a grand jury witness until just prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations, 0 2 and proceeding on a previously overlooked or dismissed charge once an unrelated convic03
tion is reversed on appeal.1
The foregoing analysis offers little hope that a motion to dismiss
the indictment, such as that filed on behalf of the hypothetical client in Section IA, will prevail. 4 The client depicted there will
likely face trial, although time has weakened her adversarial position relative to the prosecution. Indeed, virtually every case decided under the Supreme Court's Lovasco analysis has extended

99. United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Purham,
725 F.2d 450, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 441 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
100. United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1984).
101. United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1293 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934
(1986).
102. United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 589 (1st Cir. 1982).
103. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1385 (9th Cir. 1978).
104. Contrary to expectation in the case on which the illustration in Section IA is based,
the trial judge granted the motion to dismiss the indictment. After a day of testimony from
prosecution and defense witnesses, the judge found that the pre-indictment delay had
prejudiced the defendant and that the government had no legitimate explanation for the
delay. The evidence showed that the undercover officer, the complainant in the case, had
surfaced soon after the underlying incident and that the government neither sought nor
gathered evidence after the date on which the incident occurred. Hence the court found the
pre-indictment delay violative of due process. Although the judge did not make explicit the
standard that he applied, he did cite favorably the pre-Lovasco case law in the District of
Columbia, especially Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The judge's decision may also have been influenced by the defendant's incarceration on another offense,
such that dismissal of this indictment did not result in his release to the community.
Nevertheless, the result is surprising because trial judges always have the option of reserving decision on a dismissal motion until after the trial has been conducted, at which time
they can better evaluate whether a period of charging delay has in fact impaired the trial.
See, e.g., People v. Price, 165 Cal. App. 3d 536, 542, 211 Cal. Rptr. 642, 646 (1985); People v.
Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 641, 477 P.2d 421, 438, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1970). Such a decision
would create difficulties for the defense. For example, the same witnesses needed to show
prejudice by testifying at the motion hearings about their faded memories might have to be
relied on at trial for the assistance of their partial recollections. Not only might the prosecution impeach these witnesses with their prior claims of memory failure, but the defense
attorney might be forced to put the best face possible on the defense presented, glossing
over the delay-created weaknesses in order to persuade the fact-finder of the merits of the
remaining defense case. Clearly, the defense strategy at the motion hearing and the defense
strategy at trial can undercut each other.
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constitutional approval to long periods of charging delay. 105 Had
the Supreme Court adopted other sorts of analyses, the outcomes
of these cases might not have been so uniform. The doctrinal alternatives available to the Court at the time of its Lovasco decision
are worth closer scrutiny.
III.

ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES

In outlining the prevailing doctrinal form for analyzing the problem of pre-accusation delay, the Supreme Court has explicitly or
implicitly rejected alternative forms of analysis. I examine the
most salient of these alternatives at the outset. The purpose of this
examination is to inform more fully our judgments about the value
of the chosen road by comparing it with roads not taken.
A.

Speedy Trial

Observers of the legal system have long been concerned with
"the law's delay."' 01 The framers enacted this concern into law in
the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. 0 7 The
speedy trial clause, which is first in the sixth amendment's catalogue of criminal trial rights, 08 had distinguished precursors in
105. Extensive research involving hundreds of federal and state cases has produced only a
few exceptions. Those few cases in which courts have found pre-accusation delay to transgress due process strictures are as follows: United States v. Glist, 594 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.
1979); Howell v. Barker, 684 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.N.C. 1988); United States v. Sample, 565 F.
Supp. 1166 (E.D. Va. 1983); United States v. Morrison, 518 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150, 472 N.E.2d 1097 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084.
106. In Hamlet's famous soliloquy beginning "To be, or not to be," the prince cites "the
law's delay" as one of the agonies justifying suicide:
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The pangs of despised love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make with
a bare bodkin?
Shakespeare, Hamlet, act III, scene I, lines 70-76 (THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1135, 1160
(1974)).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ....").
108. The full text of the sixth amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
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English jurisprudence-the Assize of Clarendon (1166),l 9 Magna
Carta (1215), 11° Habeas Corpus Act (1679)"-in colonial bills of
rights' 12 and original state constitutions."l 3 The right to come to
trial "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays manu-

shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Id.
109. The Assize of Clarendon, found in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 408 (1953), is

cited in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 n.9 (1967):
And when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has been arrested
through the aforesaid oath, if the justices are not about to come speedily
enough into the country where they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word
to the nearest justice by some well-informed person that they have arrested
such men, and the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs informing them
where they desire the men to be brought before them; and let the sheriffs bring
them before the justices.
110. The pertinent passage reads: "[W]e will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right." MAGNA CARTA, ch. 29 [ch. 40 of KING JOHN'S CHARTER of 1215] (1225), translated
and quoted in E.COKE,THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45
(Brooke 5th ed. 1797), cited in Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.
Sir Edward Coke, a primary influence on colonial American law, interpreted chapter 29 of
the Magna Carta in this manner: "[E]very subject of this realme. . . may take his remedy
by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely
without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay." E. COKE, supra, at 55,
quoted in Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 224.
111. 31 Car. II, ch. 2, § 1. For a further discussion of the relationship between the British
Habeas Corpus Act and modern speedy trial rights, see United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D.
183, 196-97 (D. Md.), aff'd. mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
112. See, e.g., VA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 8 ("[A] man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial . . ...
"), cited in Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225.
113. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. part I, art. IX:

Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and
without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial;
promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted this provision as a guarantee of
the right to a speedy trial. See Commonwealth v. Henley, 337 Mass. 384, 387, 149 N.E.2d
608, 610 (1958).
See also DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1792); Ky. CONST. art. XII, § 10 (1792); MD. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights, art. XIX (1776); N.H. CONST. part I, art. XIV (1784); PA. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights, art. 1, § IX (1776); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1796); VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. X (1786). These constitutions are cited in Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225-26 n.21.
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factured by the ministers of justice" 114 -the oft-cited nineteenth
century definition of the sixth amendment right-was deemed so
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" ' 15 that in Klopfer v.
6 it was incorporated through the fourteenth
North Carolina,"1
amendment as a limit on state action and is guaranteed independently in each of the fifty states. 1 7 In the federal system, 18 as in
many states, 1 9 speedy trial rights receive both constitutional and
statutory protection, the latter often taking the form of precise
timing requirements for the commencement of trial.
The framers crafted the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment to address the problem of delay in coming to judgment
before a criminal tribunal. They believed this concern with delay
would serve the underlying purposes of effective law enforcement
and enhanced deterrence, 2 ° while shielding individuals from the
problems engendered by prolonged periods of unresolved criminal
liability, particularly problems of anxiety, oppressive pretrial incarceration and loss of defense evidence.' 2 ' Because delay can occur at any stage of the criminal process, from offense to conviction,

114. See Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 197 (citing BLACK'S

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 266).

115. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). This is one expression of the selective
incorporation standard by which judges determine whether particular amendments of the
federal constitution are applicable to the states. See id. at 325-29.
116. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
117. Id. at 226.
118. See The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988) (as amended by
Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat. 331); see also FED. R.
CrIM. P. 48(b):
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in
filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the
district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial,
the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
119. See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36, 43C MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. (West 1980), which essentially guarantees trial within twelve months of the defendant's first court appearance, excluding specifically itemized delays not fairly attributable to the prosecution. A complete
list of state speedy trial statutes appears in ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.1 (1967).
120. See J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (Ogden ed. 1931). "[I]t is desirable
that punishment should follow offence as closely as possible; for its impression upon the
minds of men is weakened by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of
punishment, by affording new chances of escape." Id.
121. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). "This guarantee is an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." Id. at 120.

1990]

THE PROBLEM OF DELAY

631

the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee would seem to be served
fully only by limiting undue delay at whatever point in the process
1 23
it occurs. 1 22 Nevertheless, in United States v. Marion,
the Supreme Court held that sixth amendment speedy trial protection
24
did not encompass delays occurring in the pre-accusation period.
In so holding, the Court relied heavily on interpretations of state
and federal cases and statutes. The Court found a far greater number of legislative and judicial constructions of speedy trial provisions that excluded pre-accusation 'delay from sixth amendment
125
protection than included it.
Despite the results of the Court's tally, some of the purposes of
speedy trial protection are weakened considerably when we withhold pre-charge delay from the reach of the protection's grasp. To
the extent that prolonged delay in charging possibly harms the
prosecution either through loss of evidence or loss of the ability to
locate the defendant, it undermines the purpose of providing incentives for effective law enforcement. 126 Moreover, whatever deterrence criminal sanctions furnish is enhanced to the extent that
punishment follows closely upon the offense, not simply upon the
charge; therefore, a speedy trial following an indictment issued after extended delay poorly serves the purpose of deterrence.
Clearly, the deterrence rationale for speedy trial supports inclusion
of pre-charge delay within the shelter of the speedy trial umbrella.
Furthermore, a trial conducted years after the alleged commission of an offense may suffer impaired fact-finding, an impairment
that is not diminished if the delay transpires prior to charging. In
fact, uncharged defendants lacking notice of a prosecution that
would induce them to forestall the erosion of defense evidence are
likely to suffer even greater delay-related prejudice than are
charged defendants. 2 ' The sixth amendment's right to a speedy
trial, embodying as it does a historical concern with delay's decay

122. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
123. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
124. Id. at 313.
125. Id. at 315-20.
126. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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of the adversarial process,"" would seem to be the logical source of
protection against such decay, whether it was caused by delay in
the pre-charge or the post-charge period. 12 9 The exclusion of precharge delay from the sixth amendment's scope serves the underlying purpose of the speedy trial guarantee less successfully than its
inclusion.
In Marion, Supreme Court removed pre-accusation delay from
speedy trial purview by claiming that post-accusation delay implicates different interests than pre-accusation delay. 130 A more accurate characterization, however, is that pre-accusation delay implicates a subset of the three readily identifiable speedy trial
interests: to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize
the anxiety and concern of the accused, and to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.' 3 ' In Barker v. Wingo, 32 decided
six months after Marion, the Supreme Court labeled the third of
these interests the "most serious" interest of all because "the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. '1 33 By contrast, the Marion majority
had relegated the third interest, limiting defense impairment, to a
position of lesser importance, asserting that "the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from
actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense."' 3 The
Court's contrary position in Marion diminished the importance of
the problem of defense prejudice and thereby helped justify the
Court's separation of pre-accusation delays, in which defense

128. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text; see also United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1947):
As in all long-delayed cases, the witnesses now are scattered; some are not accessible, more particularly to the defendants who are without funds; the memories of witnesses as to events occurring many years ago are not clear. It is for
these reasons among others that the Constitution of the United States requires
a speedy trial ....
129. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 321. "Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may
impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself." Id.
130. Id. at 320.
131. See supra note 121. These interests were reiterated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
532 (1972).
132. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
133. Id. at 532.
134. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320.
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prejudice is the leading concern, from post-accusation delays, in
which defense prejudice is accompanied by additional concerns.
The argument that post-accusation and pre-accusation delays
implicate different interests is facilitated as well by the Court's
muddled approach to resolving speedy trial problems. In Strunk v.
3 5 the Supreme Court held that dismissal is the
United States,"
only possible remedy for a speedy trial violation. 13s Yet, as Professor Amsterdam has suggested,13 7 if the speedy trial wrong in a particular case is oppressive pretrial incarceration, the appropriate
remedy would be simply to release the defendant from pretrial
custody pending trial; if the particular wrong is pretrial anxiety,
the appropriate remedy would be to expedite the trial. Only when
the wrong complained of is the impairment of the defense would
the responsive remedy be to dismiss the prosecution.
If the speedy trial issue were addressed and analyzed according
to these distinct interests, the problem of pre-accusation delay
would be equivalent, in underlying concern and appropriate response, to the sole speedy trial problem-defense prejudice-that
warrants dismissal. Had the Supreme Court accepted Professor
Amsterdam's tutelage in this area, courts today might analyze prejudicial pre-accusation delay under the Barker v. Wingo balancing
approach as the most serious kind of speedy trial problem. 3 8 Instead, the prevailing confusion in speedy trial jurisprudence has
contributed to the mechanical severance of pre-accusation delay
from the speedy trial context.
In severing pre-accusation delay from the speedy trial context,
the Supreme Court also relied on the argument that the sixth
amendment, by its own terms, applies only to the "accused," indicating its focus on the period after which a defendant is formally

135. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
136. Id. at 440.
137. See Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial:Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525,
535 (1975).
138. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972):
The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed ....
[S]ome of the factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been
deprived of his right . . [are] [l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
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charged.' 1 9 Although this is one possible interpretation of the sixth
amendment, it is not the only interpretation. The amendment may
use the word "accused" because a trial, speedy or not, is a definitional impossibility without an accusation. Persons facing trial become the accused at some point, and only at that point do they
have the requisite injury and stake in the outcome to complain of
delays in being brought to trial, no matter when those delays occurred. 4" In choosing between these interpretations, we receive no
guidance from the drafters' intentions in selecting the word "accused," because unlike some other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the sixth amendment was little discussed before its approval.'
Without the interpretive aid that legislative history might have
provided, we must look for guidance elsewhere to determine
whether the sixth amendment means, as the Court insisted, "what
it appears to say.' 42 The Court's reliance on literalism is surprising, because a truly literal reading of the speedy trial clause would
furnish protection only against delays arising during the presentation of proof at the trial itself, 43 an interpretation at odds with
history. 1 44 History provides other evidence to suggest that the sixth
amendment should not be read literally. First is the evidence from
early common law. In a case from colonial America, The King v.
Robinson,145 the court refused a motion for a criminal information
against the defendant, in part, on the ground that more than two

139. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313-20 (1971).
140. See id. at 328 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("But the words 'the accused,' as I understand them in their Sixth Amendment setting, mean only the person who has standing to
complain of prosecutorial delay in seeking an indictment or filing an information.").
141. The absence of a guarantee of political rights, such as those found in most state
constitutions, fueled the ratification debates over the United States Constitution in 1789,
but few of the public debates concerned criminal trial rights. See Clinton, supra note 3, at
731. The congressional debates about the Bill of Rights reveal nothing about the reception
of the sixth amendment, suggesting that Congress considered its language either relatively
noncontroversial or relatively inconsequential. Id. at 732-33 (citing 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 983-1167 (1971)).
142. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 314.
143. Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 491 (1968).
144. See the admonition of Judge Learned Hand in Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,
624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring) ("There is no surer way to misread a document
than to read it literally."), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). See
generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-24 (1972), which clearly contemplates delays
between charging and trial.
145. 1 Black. W. 541, 96 Eng. Rep. 313 (1765).
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years had passed since the offense, and "the delay is not accounted
for.""' Similar interpretations of our common law heritage are
found in three nineteenth century British cases. In The King v.
Marshall and Grantham,4 7 the court denied an application to proceed with criminal prosecution "because it was made so late."' 4 8 In
The Queen v. Hext,149 the court denied a criminal information because a full term of the court had expired since the alleged assault
had taken place. Although the applicant had good reasons for the
delay-an attempt to settle the case-the court held that the information "ought to have been more prompt."'' 50 Likewise, in The
Queen v. Robins,' 51 a two-year delay in charging bestiality led to a
directed verdict of acquittal because a trial after such a lapse
52
would be "monstrous.'
Although the British cases postdate the Constitution, if they accurately reflect American common law heritage, they may represent the framers' understanding of the sixth amendment. Moreover, the framers may have constitutionalized the single colonial
American case on the subject into the speedy trial clause. Although
no evidence explicitly affirms this possibility, neither does any
deny it. Nevertheless, in a footnote to the Marion opinion, the Supreme Court rejected this argument from the common law, preferring to focus instead on the English Habeas Corpus Act, another
sixth amendment antecedent, which did not apply to pre-accusation delay. 153 Although the common law heritage seems to make a
persuasive argument for including pre-accusation delay in speedy
trial analysis, all that can be said with certainty is that the history
is ambiguous.
A second historical argument based on British common law relates to the manner in which eighteenth century British prosecutions were commenced. A prosecution commenced when a private
party retained counsel and filed a lawsuit alleging a crime had oc-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 542, 96 Eng. Rep. at 314.
13 East 322, 104 Eng. Rep. 394 (1811).
Id.
4 Jurist 339 (1840).
Id.
1 Cox Crim. Cas. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844).
Id.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1971).
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curred. Thereafter, an application for a criminal prosecution was
filed, asking a defendant to show cause why he should not be imprisoned. 54 Hence, according to the British practice inherited by
colonial America, a person was "accused" before being formally
charged. In this historical context, the word "accused" appears to
have had a more general meaning when the sixth amendment was
drafted than it has today.
A third historical argument arises from the two cases of United
States v. Burr. 55 In these cases, Chief Justice Marshall, the preeminent constitutional jurist of early America, rejected the notion
that sixth amendment trial rights take effect only after indictment. ' 6 Although he was speaking specifically of compulsory process rights, Marshall viewed the sixth amendment as protecting
the preparation and presentation of a defense, such that if events
preceding indictment impaired this preparation or presentation,
the sixth amendment would be transgressed. 157 If, as some commentators contend, the opinions of judges who were the framers'
contemporaries are entitled to considerable weight in construing
the framers' intentions, 5 " Marshall's expansive view of the sixth
amendment presents a powerful argument against literalism in
speedy trial analysis.
A final historical argument resides in more recent constitutional
history. Despite its limitation only to the "accused," another sixth
amendment right-the right to assistance of counsel-has been
held to attach prior to indictment. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 59 the
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attached during preaccusation interrogation when "the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect."'16 0 In so holding, the Court said, "It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these
154. See G. DESSION,

CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER

356 (1948), cited

in Marion, 404 U.S. at 329 (Douglas, J., concurring).
155. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) [hereinafter
Burr I]; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) [hereinafter

Burr II].
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 33.
See id.
See C. BEARD, THE SUPREME
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Id. at 490-91.

COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

113-18 (1912).
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circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation,
the authorities had secured a formal indictment. '161 Although
courts have largely ignored Escobedo since the advent of Miranda
v. Arizona,'6 2 its logic still has force. The Court's reasoning in Escobedo rejects exalting form over substance by claiming that delays
in the criminal process take on sixth amendment proportions only
if the authorities have secured a formal indictment.
Although none of the historical arguments against literalism in
sixth amendment interpretation is dispositive, cumulatively they
have persuasive power. This power is enhanced by a further argument: The speedy trial guarantee should be interpreted in the
manner that most fully realizes its intended objectives.1 6 1 Construing the speedy trial provision to exclude pre-accusation delay does
not advance its purposes, as described above, nearly as effectively
as would an inclusive construction. 6 4 The best reading of a textual
provision that poses constitutional limits on delays in the criminal
process is one that encompasses all delays that might adversely affect the criminal trial. By that standard, the prevailing interpreta-

161. Id. at 486.
162. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the holding in Miranda is similar to the holding in
Escobedo, the Court in Miranda grounded its protection of the accused during pre-charge
interrogation in the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than in the
sixth amendment right to counsel. See id. at 467.
163. Support for this argument can be found in the language of a number of cases. See,
e.g., Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), afl'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945), cited in
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 75 n.4 (1974):
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of
any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the
surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress
out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the
surest guide to their meaning.
See also Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914):
[T]he provisions of the [sixth amendment] are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted
from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not
simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin
and the line of their growth.
Accord Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intent of its makers.").
164. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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tion of the speedy trial clause does not appear to be the best
interpretation.
B.

Compulsory Process

Another logical application of doctrinal forms to the problem of
pre-accusation delay is to view delay-related prejudice as contravening the rights protected by the sixth amendment's compulsory
process clause. 165 Although explicitly protecting only the accused's
right to subpoena witnesses, courts have read the guarantee of
compulsory process expansively enough in recent years to give constitutional shelter to the accused's right to secure witnesses and
evidence to present in his or her defense. 166 Professor Westen argues persuasively that the compulsory process right, undergirded
by assumptions about the value of an adversarial process, encompasses the right to discover the existence of potential witnesses, to
put them on the stand, to have their testimony admitted into evidence, to have it believed and to enjoy a general balance of advan6 7
tage with the prosecution regarding the presentation of evidence.
Arguably, if the government's delay in bringing a prosecution results in the loss of witnesses, or specific portions of testimony, or
any other evidence that the defendant would otherwise have had
available and that bears on the defense, then the state, as the
source of the delay, should be estopped from prosecuting the defendant.6 " Having deprived the defendant of information to refute
the prosecution's case or to affirmatively establish innocence, the
delay has frustrated the foundational principles of adversarial

165. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compul. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
166. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967):a
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury
so it may decide where the truth lies . . . . This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
167. Westen, supra note 163, at 120-21.
168. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), the Supreme Court noted that if a
defendant can make a showing of adverse consequences to the representation received, or to
the fairness of the proceedings leading to conviction, dismissal would be an appropriate
remedy. Id. at 365.

sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .
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A
equilibrium that underlie the concept of compulsory process.'
trial under these circumstances would be adversarial in appearance, but not in substance because the actions, or failure of action,
of one adversary would have disabled the other. 17 0 The reliability
of the outcome generated by such an impoverished trial could not
be trusted, raising the specter of false convictions.'" If a trial consistent with constitutional values of procedural fairness could no
longer be held, then the indictment or information would have to
be dismissed.
This application of compulsory process principles to instances of
pre-accusation delay finds analogical support in a variety of cases
employing compulsory process analyses. The notion that prosecution is foreclosed when the accused is deprived of evidence potentially material to his or her defense has jurisprudential roots as
early as Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in United States v.
Burr.7 2 When Burr sought access, over arguments of presidential
privilege, to President Jefferson's letters from General James Wilkinson, which formed the basis for Jefferson's message to Congress
charging Burr with treasonous acts, Justice Marshall ruled that the

169. See Westen, supra note 163, at 177-82; see also Washington, 388 U.S. at 19 ("Just as
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.");
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (finding due process violation in notice-of-alibi
rule that provides no reciprocal discovery rights to defense because there must be a "balance of forces between the accused and his accuser").
170. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court described the
need for full fact development by both adversaries:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity
of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.
Id. at 709.
171. See Kadish, supra note 27, for a description of the importance to our legal system of
good procedures for guilt determination.
172. Burr I, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); Burr II, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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prosecution would be suspended until the letters were produced.173
Although Marshall admitted that the defendant's need for disclosure had to be balanced against the President's need for secrecy,
he found the defendant's interests weightier because it would be "a
very serious thing, if such letter should contain any information
material to the defence, to withhold from the accused the power of
making use of it."'1

74

Presumably, if the letters had been lost or

never made available, the Court would have dismissed the prosecution. The integrity of the process required that the state not force
the accused to face prosecution without the benefit of potentially
exculpatory information.
The Court decided the next important compulsory process case
160 years after United States v. Burr. The Court in Washington v.
Texas175 invalidated on compulsory process grounds a Texas statute that disqualified accomplices as incompetent to testify for the
defense in criminal trials.

76

The Court construed compulsory pro-

cess to mean not just the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and to offer their testimony, but "in plain terms the right to
present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of
the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide
where the truth lies.

'1 77

In essence, this opinion affirmed a sub-

stantive compulsory process right to have defense evidence admitted at trial, suggesting that the state violates that right if its
choices regarding the timing of bringing charges render material
defense evidence unavailable. Therefore, pre-accusation delay that
produces evidentiary deficits in the defense can, under a compulsory process rubric, deprive the state of the authority to conduct a
prosecution.

178

173. See Burr 11, 25 F. Cas. at 192.
174. Id.
175. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
176. See id. at 23.
177. Id. at 19.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
920 (1978).
We agree with the Ninth Circuit because it seems to us beyond serious dispute
that the essence of the right to compulsory process is lost when the government can act ... to deprive a defendant of the testimony of an eyewitness to
the crime for which he or she is charged.
Id. at 1360-61.
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In Burr I and Washington, the government was only indirectly
responsible for causing the unavailability of material defense evidence. 17 9 Other cases involve state conduct that more directly contributes to the loss of defense evidence. 180 For example, in Webb v.
179. In each case, the government's action that deprived the defense of evidence was simply its compliance with a rule or statute, a presidential privilege statute in Burr II and a
disqualification statute for accomplice testimony in Washington.See BurrII, 25 F. Cas. 187
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Supreme
Court has indicated that the government's invocation of evidentiary privileges that deprive
defendants of important evidence will result in dismissal of criminal charges. See United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953); see also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
671-72 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds
the information, dismiss the action.
Id. Professor Westen notes that this language is "suggestive of compulsory process." Westen, supra note 163, at 164.
Although the Court may require the prosecution to disregard evidentiary rules that contribute to defense impairment, courts do not usually require the prosecution, at least with
respect to one set of circumstances, to actively remove a constitutional impediment to defense evidence. Generally, when a defense witness validly invokes a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court does not require the government to enforce the
defendant's right to compulsory process through grants of immunity to the witness. See
United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985);
United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 966 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985);
Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1442-44 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 1138
(1986); United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 152324 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1282-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 259-60 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982); United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 960 (1982); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962-63 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980). The Third Circuit has, however, recognized under
certain circumstances a due process right to compel a grant of immunity to a defense witness claiming the fifth amendment privilege. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
180. See Anderson v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 696 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982) (compulsory process violated when trial judge pressed defense witnesses to change their testimony), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983); Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179, 182-84 (E.D.
Cal. 1980) (trial court coerced witness into giving inculpatory evidence by twice warning him
that his probation would be revoked and perjury charges filed if he did not tell the truth);
State v. Fernandez, 198 Conn. 1, 7-18, 501 A.2d 1195, 1199-1203 (1985) (due process violation when judge's questioning appeared to reject credibility of only defense witness); State
v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 377-78, 316 A.2d 439, 447 (1974) (trial judge persistently advised
defense witness of his privilege against self incrimination and his fifth amendment rights);
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Texas, 8 a state trial judge admonished the sole defense witness
about the consequences of perjury in such an intimidating fashion
that the witness subsequently declined to testify. 82 According to
the Supreme Court, the judge's unnecessarily harsh words "effectively drove that witness off the stand."'183 Although relying largely
on Washington, the leading compulsory process case, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction on due process grounds, stating
that the judge's actions in causing the loss of the only defense witness deprived the defendant of a fair trial.8
Similarly, other cases in which prosecutors or law enforcement
officials harass defense witnesses,' 85 or discourage potential witsee also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 (1973) (trial court refused to permit
defense to cross-examine a witness and to bring three other witnesses to the stand). Although Chambers was decided as a confrontation clause case, it has compulsory process
overtones. See Westen, supra note 23, at 601-24.
181. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
182. Id. at 96.
183. Id. at 98.
184. Id. Controversy currently reigns regarding the circumstances under which trial
judges may exclude the testimony of defense witnesses as a sanction for a defendant's having failed to disclose the identity of the witnesses under alibi-notice rules of reciprocal discovery. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Supreme Court authorized a witnesses
preclusion sanction under circumstances of willful tactical violation of discovery rules. Following Taylor, some lower courts have upheld preclusion sanctions. See, e.g., Cox v. Wyrick,
873 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1989) (deliberate and egregious attempt to obtain tactical advantage);
Chappee v. Rose, 843 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1988) (same). Others hold that the preclusion sanction violates principles of compulsory process. See, e.g., Walker v. Hood, 679 F. Supp. 372,
380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (employing balancing test); People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 55859 (Colo. 1989) (same); McCarty v. State, 107 N.M. 651, -, 763 P.2d 360, 364 (1988) (same).
185. See, e.g., United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecutor
telephoned lawyer of defendant's girlfriend to warn that if she testified at trial she could be
re-indicted on dropped charges); United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 702-03 (5th Cir.
1980) (defense witness intimidated by prison officials' threats regarding his testimony at
trial); Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1979) (police detective concealed
location of witness), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); United States v. Hammond, 598
F.2d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir. 1979) (FBI agent threatened defense witness with retaliation in
another case pending against him), rehearinggranted,605 F.2d 862 (1979); United States v.
Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 804-06 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's refusal to provide informant's
address despite court order thwarted defense's ability to prepare its case); Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir.) (deliberate concealment by prosecutor of two eyewitnesses), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873 (1978); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 226-28
(3d Cir. 1976) (prosecutor repeatedly warned defense witness and personally intimidated her
concerning possibility of federal perjury charge if she testified falsely); United States v.
Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1973) (defense witness told by secret service agent
during recess of trial that he would be prosecuted for a felony if he testified); United States
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nesses from speaking to defense investigators, 8 6 have found compulsory process or due process violations in the loss of potential
defense evidence. Moreover, in Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 8 "7 the Second Circuit found a compulsory process violation when the state's
negligence had contributed to the unavailability of a witness. In
marked contrast to pre-accusation delay doctrine, the Supreme
Court in Webb required no showing of specific prejudice in circumstances involving interference with defense witnesses.' 88 Other
courts have reversed convictions despite overwhelming evidence of
guilt and official good faith because the right to present a defense
protected by the sixth and fourteenth amendments is so funda89
mental that courts cannot treat its infraction as harmless error.
In some circumstances involving prejudicial pre-accusation delay, the state frustrates the right to present a defense not through
active interference with witnesses, but through passive, perhaps
even unwitting, interference. This distinction is irrelevant to compulsory process analysis. The defendant, whose defense case may
v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976, 979 *(D.C. Cir. 1973) (prosecutor advised defense witness that if he
testified he would be prosecuted on other unrelated charges); United States v. Jones, 476
F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (prosecutor intimidated witness leading to refusal to testify);
Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1970) (prosecutor intimidated witness who later
declined to testify); cf. United States v. Simmons, 699 F.2d 1250, 1251 (D.C. Cir.) (no compulsory process violation when key witness' testimony not based on government threats but
on advice of counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835 (1983); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d
1325, 1334-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (no compulsory process violation when government warned
witness of possible perjury charges if she testified falsely; violation found in threat of instituting certain charges against her); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir.
1982) (no compulsory process violation when government warned witnesses that they were
targets of ongoing rather than potential grand jury investigation), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983).
186. See, e.g., Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (prosecutor
advised defense witness not to speak with defense counsel unless the prosecutor was present); cf. United States v. Rogers, 642 F. Supp. 934, 934-35 (D.C. Colo. 1986) (prosecutor's
letter informing witnesses that they need not speak to defense is corrected by letter from
court advising them of rights and responsibilities).
187. 583 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979).
188. See Webb, 409 U.S. at 98.
189. See United States v. Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358, 1361-63 (7th Cir.) (no need to find
willful misconduct to uphold dismissal of indictment), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 920 (1978).
But see United States v. Hammond, 815 F.2d 302, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987) (interference with
defense witness by FBI agents and federal prosecutors, though improper, was harmless error); State v. Mussehl, 408 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1987) (letter from prosecutor to potential witnesses discouraging them from talking to defense investigators was improper, but no
showing it prejudicially impeded defense investigation).
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have evaporated during a period of pre-accusation delay, suffers an
injury, although often less demonstrable, that is the same as that
suffered by the defendant in Webb and its progeny. 9 0 In both situations, the state's actions serve to undermine the defendant's use
of the subpoena power.' 9 ' To hold that a fundamental right that is
scrupulously protected against obstruction should, in this instance,
be vulnerable to the state's active or passive decision to delay filing
charges is inconsistent.
The proposition that courts can appropriately evaluate delay
within a compulsory process framework finds support in an instructive line of compulsory process cases involving deportation of
alien witnesses. 92 In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,'9 3 the

190. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1988) (loss of
potential defense witness); United States v. Acevedo, 842 F.2d 502, 504-05 (1st Cir. 1988)
(defense was unable to locate witnesses); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 633-34 (7th
Cir. 1987) (death of two defense witnesses during delay), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046 (1988);
United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1987) (death of two potential defense
witnesses), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258,
263-67 (4th Cir. 1981) (loss of testimony of defense witness), rev'd, 456 U.S. 1, 6-11 (1982);
United States v. King, 560 F.2d 122, 129-31 (2d Cir.) (potential defense witness died during
delay), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977).
191. As observed in a leading treatise, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 878
(1985): "The teaching of Webb v. Texas is that the government has a responsibility not to
take actions that undermine the defendant's use of the subpoena authority."
192. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo-Martinez, 669 F.2d 1131, 1132-37 (6th Cir.) (dismissal required by government's deportation of 14 potential defense witnesses in violation
of defendants' due process rights), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982); United
States v. Gonzales, 617 F.2d 1358, 1362-64 (9th Cir.) (due process violation when government permitted witness to leave country in lieu of deportation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); United States v. Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358, 1360-63 (7th Cir.) (dismissal required when
witnesses were made unavailable by affirmative government action), cert. dismissed, 439
U.S. 920 (1978); United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1974) (release of
35 potential witnesses was due process violation); United States v. Mendez-Rodriquez, 450
F.2d 1, 2-5 (9th Cir. 1971) (deportation of three aliens deprived defense of potential witnesses and due process of law); United States v. Tariq, 521 F. Supp. 773, 779-83 (D.C. Md.
1981) (due process and compulsory process violation when, by deporting witness, government interfered with defendant's ability to discover, prepare or offer exculpatory or relevant
evidence); cf. United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 27-28 (1st Cir.) (government deportation
of juvenile alien found not to violate defendant's due process and compulsory process rights
when no showing that witness would have offered meaningful evidence), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 828 (1982); United States v. Marquez-Amaya, 686 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1982) (no violation
when no plausible showing that deported witness was material and favorable to defense);
United States v. Trinidad, 660 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1981) (no violation when deported witnesses' testimony would not have been relevant).
193. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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Supreme Court indicated that the government's deportation of
alien witnesses could work a compulsory process violation if the
defendant were able to show "that the evidence lost would be both
material and favorable to the defense." 194 Although in that case
prompt deportation deprived the accused of the opportunity to interview witnesses, the Court did not require the defendant to
render a detailed description of the lost testimony. 195 The Court
merely asked him to make some showing of materiality; or at the
very least, to advance some "'plausible theory' of how the testimony would be helpful," a burden that Valenzuela-Bernal failed to
meet.

96

Likewise, when the government is responsible for delay that
causes loss of evidence to the accused, the delay works a compulsory process injury if the accused makes some showing that the
missing evidence is material and favorable. The evidence lost
through pre-accusation delay is like the evidence lost through deported witnesses never interviewed by the defense. Following this
logic, a court should not require a specific description of unavailable testimony, but rather a plausible theory of the contribution
such testimony would have made to the defense case. The
Valenzuela-Bernal requirements for establishing a compulsory
process violation are far less stringent and comport more closely to
the realities of a missing evidence situation than the tests courts
presently apply in pre-accusation delay cases.19

Arguably, we should analyze the two lines of cases differently
because the government at the time of deportation is generally
aware that it is making a potential witness unavailable. Therefore,
courts should hold the government to a higher standard in the deportation cases than in the delay cases, in which the evidentiary
effect on a particular defendant may not be as apparent. But

194. Id. at 873.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 874 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
197. The realities of a missing evidence situation were apparent to Chief Justice Marshall
in the Burr cases. Burr I, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); Burr II, 25 F. Cas.
187 (C.C.D. Va. 1907) (No. 14,694). He observed that expecting the defendant to relate the
precise nature of missing evidence was unreasonable. Burr II, 25 F. Cas. at 191. However, he
required the defendant to supply a "reason for supposing that the testimony may be material." Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 38.
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where is the line between design and inadvertence? In criminal
matters, particularly those of a serious nature, a prosecutor who
has chosen to use the tools of state power to respond coercively to
a defendant's alleged offenses hardly has a benign or neutral view
of that defendant. 198 To entrust the only protection a defendant's
case has from the ravages of charging delay to a prosecutor-a person in an adversarial posture, professionally and psychologically-is to invite failure. 99 The tendency of an adversary, at least
unconsciously, to devalue or underestimate or fail to realize the
impact on an opponent's case of a decision to delay charging, or to
make any otherwise legitimate prosecutorial choice, may obscure
the line between design and inadvertence in the delay-based loss of
potentially exculpatory defense evidence. 00
Even if the distinction between the two levels of culpabilitychoosing to harm an opponent's case and failing to consider the
harm to an opponent's case-can be maintained, it is helpful to
consider the analysis developed for cases in which the state loses
evidence that may exculpate the defendant. California v.
198. See Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1365, 1387 (1987).
199. The Supreme Court has recognized that a person's judgments may be influenced by
his or her role in the proceedings to which the judgments are relevant. For example, in
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), the Court found reversible error in the trial
court's refusal to permit defendants to examine the grand jury testimony of government
witnesses. In finding insufficient even a judge's in camera inspection of the grand jury transcript for possible impeachment material, Justice Fortas wrote: "The determination of what
may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate." Id.
at 875. Clearly, according to this logic, the determination of what may be harmful to the
defense cannot properly and effectively be made by an opponent alone, with no guidance or
oversight.
200. Professor Lawrence has argued for a greater recognition in legal doctrine of the role
of the unconscious in legal doctrine. See Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). He challenges traditional
notions of intent, asserting that many injurious acts are neither intentional--"in the sense
that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought"-nor unintentional-"in the sense that
the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs,
desires, and wishes." Id. at 322. Rather, according to Freudian theory, the human mind
guards itself against discomfort by denying or refusing to recognize its own motives, when
those motives conflict with what one has learned is right. Id. Although Lawrence's argument
specifically addresses the problem of racial motivation, it may be applied to other situations
in which an actor (for example, a prosecutor) may have a personal interest in behaving
contrary to the interests of another (for example, a defendant).
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Trombetta201 is such a case. In Trombetta the state lost breath
samples taken in a drunk driving prosecution, samples that might
have provided useful information to the defense had the state preserved them.20 2 Loss of the breath samples was of no constitutional
consequence to the Court, because states need only preserve evidence when it possesses an apparent exculpatory value and when
the defense cannot obtain comparable evidence by any other reasonable method.2 0 3 A corollary of the Trombetta holding is that
when the government loses exculpatory and unique evidence, it
breaches a constitutional duty to the defendant, even if the loss is
purely accidental. 20 4 Logically, then, if lengthy periods of pre-accu-

sation delay cause the defendant to lose irreplaceable exculpatory
evidence, then the state, as the source of the delay, should suffer
the consequences to the trial process, including forgoing prosecution if the process has been compromised beyond repair.
A pre-accusation delay case differs from Trombetta and
Valenzuela-Bernal in that the state has never had possession of
the missing evidence. The cases are alike, however, in that the defendant has never had the opportunity to come into possession of
the evidence. This is the crucial point, because if the defense can
show that the state's action permanently deprived the defendant
of the opportunity to gather once extant evidence, then the consti201. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
202. See id. at 483.
203. See id. at 489.
204. Trombetta remains good law, even after the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 109
S. Ct. 333 (1988). In Youngblood, a sexual assault prosecution, the police had failed to properly preserve semen samples so that full testing of this evidence to determine characteristics
of the assailant could be completed. Id. at 334-35. The defendant was convicted despite
expert testimony regarding the potential content of the missing evidence and despite the
trial judge's instruction to jurors that they could draw an adverse inference if they found
that the state had lost or destroyed any evidence. Id. at 335. Overturning the judgment of
the Arizona Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "unless a criminal defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence
does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. at 337. The implications of Youngblood are uncertain because its facts are far narrower than its broadly stated holding. Moreover, in reaching its holding, the Court approved and distinguished Trombetta, claiming
that the possibility that the semen samples might have exculpated Youngblood was insufficient to meet Trombetta's standard of "constitutional materiality." Id. at 336. Arguably, if
that standard of constitutional materiality can be met in another case-for example,
through a showing of actual prejudice-then bad faith need not be the sine qua non of a
due process violation.
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tutionally guaranteed subpoena authority has been drained of its
intended value. Remedying this compulsory process injury may
then require abandoning the prosecution.
Of course, prosecutions should not be needlessly abandoned. If
the evidence lost is relatively insubstantial, dismissal would not be
the appropriate remedy.?°5 But if the compulsory process injury is
so severe as to preclude the defendant's maintaining an effective
defense that would have been available absent the violation, then
dismissal of the prosecution is the only responsive remedy."'
Moreover, this analysis is consistent with the jurisprudential
trends toward outcome-oriented standards in a number of related
areas of procedural law. In United States v. Bagley,0 7 a leading
post-Brady v. Maryland20 8 opinion on disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and in Strickland v. Washington,20 9 an important recent
opinion on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court indicated
that constitutional error requires reversal only when it undermines
confidence in the outcome of a criminal trial. 21° Although the out205. This has long been the practice in the deported witness cases, in which courts have
dismissed indictments only when the released witnesses were eyewitnesses to, or active participants in, the underlying incident charged. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Morales,
632 F.2d 112, 113-15 (9th Cir. 1980) (no dismissal when deported witnesses are not potential
eyewitnesses to inducing and encouraging the offense); United States v. Gonzalez, 617 F.2d
1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.) (dismissal of counts affirmed when deported witness had observed
underlying conduct; dismissal of other counts reversed when witness had no connection to
those counts), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, 608 F.2d
1314, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1979) (no dismissal when deported witness was not eyewitness);
United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433, 434-36 (9th Cir. 1978) (no dismissal when deported witnesses could not have conceivably helped defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967
(1979); United States v. Castellanos-Machorro, 512 F.2d 1181, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1975) (no
dismissal when deported witnesses had no connection with offense charged in indictment);
United States v. McQuillan, 507 F.2d 30, 31-33 (9th Cir. 1974) (same).
206. See supra note 168; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 343 (1988): "The
societal interest in seeing criminals punished rightly requires that indictments be dismissed
only when the unavailability of the evidence prevents the defendant from receiving a fair
trial." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
208. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
209.. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
210. More precisely, the standard adopted in Strickland is as follows: "The defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Although Bagley
has no majority opinion, two opinions combine to constitute a majority perspective. Of these
two opinions, one by Justice White and one by Justice Blackmun, the latter discussed the
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come-oriented standards voiced in Bagley and Strickland represent a tightening of the prior standards for evaluating the effect
of nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence 1 ' and ineffective assistance of counsel, 212 a move toward a pure outcome-oriented standard, to conform to the prevailing trend, in the area of pre-accusation delay would represent a relaxing of the current law. If a
showing of nontactical, good faith reasons for delay always trumps
a showing of actual prejudice, as the Supreme Court has implied 1 '
and many lower courts have stated, 1 4 then the defendant cannot
prevail even though the actual prejudice may be sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. This is inconsistent
with most other strains of constitutional criminal procedure.

governing standard more extensively. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun explicitly adopted
the Strickland standard:
We find the Strickland formulation. . . sufficiently flexible to cover. . . cases
of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused: The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333,
337 (1988) (requiring bad faith on the part of officials in failing to preserve evidence to
establish a due process violation).
211. Prior to Bagley, the Court had implied that different standards applied to each of
the three different types of nondisclosure situations: situations in which a defense attorney's
request for exculpatory information was 1) non-existent, 2) general, or 3) specific. See
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976). The Agurs opinion suggests that when
the defense has made a specific request for a particular type of exculpatory evidence, the
standard of materiality that the defense must satisfy is not as high as the standard applied
when the defense has made no request or a general request. Id. at 106. The Court in Bagley,
however, adopted a single standard of materiality for all of these situations, the stringent
standard that emerged from the no request/general request situation. See Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 682-83.
212. Prior to Strickland, lower courts had adopted a number of different standards for
finding that an attorney's unprofessional performance had caused prejudice sufficient to
constitute reversible error. Some of the courts presumed prejudice, and others required that
counsel's errors have some conceivable effect on the outcome. See generally W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 191, at 531. The Court in Strickland replaced these lenient standards
with the stricter outcome-oriented standard cited supra note 210.
213. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977).
214. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Traditional Due Process

Due process remains an alternative to the Supreme Court's prescribed analysis in the area of pre-accusation delay because, I contend, the Court has distorted traditional due process analysis in
United States v. Marion2 15 and United States v. Lovasco.2 16 Despite its due process labels, the Court's present analysis is incompatible with due process principles.
Flowing from the requirement enshrined in the Magna Carta
that proceedings accord with per legem terrae, the law of the
land,217 courts have long interpreted the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to establish procedural limits on
the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial authority." 8 Although the forms and methods of due process signification have
generated considerable controversy, 19 the fact that most of the
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated
through the due process clause as limits on the states is by now
accepted. 2 In these instances, the boundaries of the due process
right are tied to prevailing interpretations of specific amendments.2 21 For example, the sixth amendment right to confront
one's accusers has been incorporated against the states as a matter

215. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
216. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
217. See Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 460 (1986); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 52125 (1884) (discussing the meaning of the law of the land); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-78 (1855) (tracing the origins of the due
process clause to the Magna Carta).
218. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276, the first Supreme Court decision
construing the due process clause:
The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be
applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not
left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The
article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free
to make any process "due process of law" by its mere will.
219. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
220. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382-83 n.11 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting), for a list
of the Supreme Court cases rendering various provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states.
221. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination as a limit on states).

1990]

THE PROBLEM OF DELAY

of fundamental fairness, and the resulting due process jurisprudence is coextensive with the corresponding sixth amendment
22 2
jurisprudence.
With the techniques of incorporationism, we have inherited a
flexible due process jurisprudence.2 23 This approach, derided by its
detractors as natural law jurisprudence,2 2 4 measures challenged
governmental practices against principles "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, 2 25 or "the American scheme of justice, "226 or
"ultimate decency in a civilized society, 22 7 or like-phrased rhetorical formulations. Underneath the hyperbole, due process, distilled
to its essence, means fairness. 2 2 s From the time of the framers to
the present, it has contemplated, at the very least, that adjudicatory proceedings be conducted fairly.2 2
Even those who advocate a narrow view of due process acknowledge that it establishes outer boundaries for the conduct of a crim-

We have held that the guarantees of the First Amendment, . . . the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment,. . . and
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment .... are all to be
enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the
same standards that protect those personal rights against federal
encroachment.
Id. at 10.
222. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
223. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). "[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id., quoted
in Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982).
224. The leading detractor was Justice Black. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting):
The "natural law" formula which the Court uses to reach its conclusion in this
case should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution
.... It subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power
over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution
limits legislative power.
See also Grant, The NaturalLaw Background of Due Process,31 COLUM. L. REV.56 (1931).
225. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
226. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
227. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61.
228. "Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair ....

."

Snyder v.

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
229. Specific evidence exists that some of the framers of the fourteenth amendment included the right to a fair trial in the concept of due process of law. See Note, Justice Without Favor:Due Process and Separation of Executil,? and JudicialPowers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1676 n.5 (1985).
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inal trial.2 3 ° With respect to a criminal sanction, the overarching
concern, indeed the meaning of fairness, has always been the reliability of the method for assigning guilt.231 Given the inherent fallibility of human discernment, we can achieve this reliability only
through procedures that minimize the risk 2that
a legally innocent
32
person will be convicted of criminal wrong.
In any decisionmaking context, accuracy is the instrumental
value that underlies due process safeguards. 3 3 Yet in the particular case of criminal sanctions, some inaccuracies are more acceptable than others. Courts have attached such special importance to
avoiding errors that disfavor the criminally accused that the cost of
sacrificing accurate decisions that disfavor the accused has been, at
least in rhetoric, graciously paid to serve that end. Nowhere does
case law make this moral and constitutional choice more apparent
than in In re Winship,3 4 which constitutionalized, as a matter of
due process, the reasonable doubt burden of proving criminal
wrongdoing. 2 5 The Court in Winship recognized the "fundamental

230. In the companion cases of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), upholding the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Justice Powell wrote in concurrence:
No longer are questions regarding the constitutionality of particular criminal
procedures resolved by focusing alone on the element in question and ascertaining whether a system of criminal justice might be imagined in which a fair
trial could be afforded in the absence of that particular element. Rather, the
focus is, as it should be, on the fundamentality of that element viewed in the
context of the basic Anglo-American jurisprudential system common to the
States. . . .That approach to due process readily accounts both for the conclusion that jury trial is fundamental and that unanimity is not.
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 372 n.9 (Powell, J. concurrring) (citation omitted).
231. Kadish, supra note 27, at 346.
232. With respect to pre-trial identification procedures, another area of intersection between due process adjudication and constitutional criminal procedure, the likelihood of reliability of the identification is the paramount concern. A due process violation inheres in an
identification procedure that is "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
233. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (reversing a conviction in which the
judge had instructed the jury that their duty was to convict when evidence of the sanity of
the accused was equally balanced). In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the
Court observed that the purpose of evidentiary and constitutional rules in criminal trials
was to "safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of
life, liberty and property." Id. at 174.
234. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
235. Id. at 364.
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value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."2 36 At least with
regard to factual disputes, doubt must be resolved in the defendant's favor.
In light of the explicit value of reliability in guilt determination
that underlies the due process clause, and the due process commitment as expressed in Winship for a systemic tilt toward inaccurate
acquittals rather than inaccurate convictions, how can the test established for evaluating the constitutionality of pre-accusation delay be deemed a due process test at all? The Lovasco opinion
evinces no concern with the reliability of convictions or the accepted allocation of the risk of error.2 3 7 In Lovasco, the Court did
not discount the effect on the trial's outcome of the defense evidence credited as lost due to delay; the Court simply never considered it.2 3s Lovasco and its progeny, which despite their various formulations seem to require something more than outcome-altering
prejudice to find a constitutional violation, are uninformed by a
due process vision. The due process label, then, is a misnomer.
An alternate vision may inform the pre-accusation delay cases.
This is a vision of due process that requires not fair results but fair
play. With respect to this issue, a defendant can ask no more than
that a prosecutor not win conviction through gamesmanship. In
many jurisdictions nontactical prosecutorial motives for delaying a
charging decision are always permissible, no matter what harm the

236. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). This is because "we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who

is guilty." Id. The social disutility of convicting an innocent man is higher because
[iut is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge

him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
guilt with utmost certainty.
Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., majority opinion).
237. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (discussing the importance of
protecting "the 'integrity of the fact-finding process' ") (quoting Berger v. California, 393
U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
238. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 785-86 (1977). A similar oversight occurred subsequently in Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336-38 (1988).
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decision engenders.2 3 9 Even the burden of prosecutorial negligence

in delaying charging is often placed on defendants as well. 240 Regardless of the merits of this approach as a pure matter of policy,
it has little to do with the extraordinary attention to accuracy that
we have typically demanded of criminal convictions as a matter of
due process.24 '
The words "fair play" appear in the Lovasco opinion. When the
Court describes the decision it faces, it reports that it is to "determine only whether the action complained of-here, compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment
to investigate further-violates those 'fundamental conceptions of
justice' which define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency.' ",242 The last clause in the sentence is from Rochin v. California,243 a case in which the Court held inadmissible the evidence
the defendant and pumping his stomach
obtained by seizing
44
2
against his will.

Although Rochin is a due process case, it flows from a separate
line of due process precedents and is animated by separate values.
In Rochin, the evidence obtained from the defendant's stomach-narcotics-was highly relevant to the charge of illegally possessing narcotics. 2 45 The reliability of the method of assigning guilt,

the traditional due process value, was not jeopardized by the government's conduct. What was jeopardized by forcibly pumping the
defendant's stomach was the notion of respect for individual dignity.2 46 By citing the Rochin standard as its guide in Lovasco, the

239. See, e.g., United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 949 (1987); United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); and cases cited supra
note 67.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1988); and cases
cited supra note 67.
241. Discussing federal employee loyalty programs, Kadish cites Supreme Court cases observing that the impact of a finding of disloyalty is similar to a criminal sanction. His conclusion from this observation reveals the importance of accuracy in criminal proceedings:
"One might expect, therefore, the requirement of a relatively strong justification for increasing the hazard of misdeterminations." Kadish, supra note 27, at 352.
242. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
243. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
244. Id. at 172-73.
245. Id. at 166.
246. See Kadish, supra note 27, at 347.
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Court implied that all that was at issue in pre-accusation delay
cases was whether the government had behaved abusively or excessively-whether it had played fairly. The Court in Lovasco then
proceeded to consider at length the fairness of the government's
conduct in these terms, ignoring entirely the more prominent due
process concern-the reliability of fact-finding methods.24 Lower
courts have followed the Supreme Court's use of the Rochin analy2 48
sis in cases of pre-accusation delay.
The Lovasco majority borrowed a standard that had been developed in a context in which reliability of fact-finding was not at
issue and applied it in a context in which reliability was the paramount issue. Inthe latter context, a fair play standard, in its oblivion to consequences, represents an impoverished constitutional vision. When the reliability of a judgment of guilt or innocence is
potentially compromised by government conduct, due process requires that the court at least address the reliability question.
One method that the Court in Lovasco might have used to address the reliability question is to apply a general due process
scheme developed outside the context of criminal procedure. In the
case of Mathews v. Eldridge,249 decided one year before Lovasco,
the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for the three distinct
interests implicated by adjudicatory procedures: the government
interests involved, the private interests affected and "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of private interests. ' 250 The Court in
Lovasco analyzed the first of these factors, the government interests involved in pre-accusation delay cases. The opinion evaluates,
for example, the need for continuing investigations,5 1 the need for
prosecutorial discretion in decisions about timing of charges 252 and
the administrative burden that requiring prosecutors to document
that decisionmaking process would entail. 5 3 Yet the Court never

247. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735 (8th Cir.) (no due process violation when government's reasons for delay were reasonable and in good faith), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 982 (1979).
249. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
250. Id. at 335.
251. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 792-93.
252. Id. at 794.
253. Id. at 793-94 n.14.
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completed its task, overlooking the other two interests that Mathews demanded it weigh in the balance. Because the other two
factors-the private liberty interests2 54 and the risk of error 255 -have considerable weight in criminal proceedings, the failure to take them as seriously as the government interests likely
distorted the due process analysis.
The apparent inconsistency between the historical due process
requirements and the context-specific due process test for assessing the constitutionality of pre-accusation delay is troubling. Yet
despite the isolation of pre-accusation delay analysis from due process norms, analogues from other jurisprudential contexts come to
mind. The change in the locus of the fairness concern in this due
process area is not unlike the change in the locus of the equality
concern in the antidiscrimination law arena. For a period of time,
antidiscrimination law toyed with proscribing practices that produced racially disproportionate effects; 256 now it has abandoned
that view in favor of a concern with racially discriminatory intent.251 The problem of pre-accusation delay represents a similar
intent/effect issue, although it has not heretofore been conceptualized in this fashion. Translating the problem into these terms, can
we say that with respect to pre-accusation delay the due process
254. "The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
255. There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake
an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other
party the burden. . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial
of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958), quoted in Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
256. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employer practices producing racially disproportionate impact made out prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII). See generally Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
257. Although a showing of disproportionate impact theoretically still makes out a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the Supreme Court has made proof of the discrimination claim more formidable. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989). Under the constitutional standard, equal protection principles are not violated
absent proof of intentional discrimination. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43
(1976).
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clause is not concerned with harm to the fact-finding process, but
only with the intent to harm the fact-finding process? Can we say
that due process principles are consistent with impaired fact-finding as long as all participants proceed in good faith? Constitutional
history suggests otherwise. In the context of criminal cases, due
process has always been concerned with consequences and the
risks posed to reliable convictions. 58
Despite the lessons of due process history, judges have fallen
into an intent-based analysis for pre-accusation delay, rather than
an effect-based approach, because of a misplaced focus of inquiry.
They are analyzing fairness from the perspective of the prosecutor,
rather than from the perspective of the defendant." 9 That judges
would view the problem of pre-accusation delay from the perspective of a prosecutor rather than a defendant is not surprising:
258. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 109
S. Ct. 333, 339 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "The Constitution requires that criminal
defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a 'good faith' try at a fair trial ....
Regardless of intent or lack thereof, police action that results in a defendant's receiving an
unfair trial constitutes a deprivation of due process." Id.
259. This proposition is demonstrated by the failure of the Court in Lovasco, in its mission to exonerate prosecutors of blame, to even consider the impact of the acknowledges
prejudice on the defendant's ability to present a case or on the reliability of the outcome. At
the point in the opinion in which the Court claims to adopt a defendant's perspective, it
simply acknowledges that requiring prosecutors to file charges as soon as they can establish
probable cause will increase the likelihood that the charges may be unwarranted and, ironically, will increase the length of post-charge delay. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 791 (1977). The fact that the Court assumed, without elaboration, that post-charge
delay was worse than pre-charge delay indicates that the Court was not contemplating seriously the potential prejudice to the defendant. Defendants may in fact prefer post-charge
delay. At least then they will have notice of charges, greater procedural rights and the opportunity through counsel to gather defense evidence. Nevertheless, constitutional protection of the accused in the the post-charge period is greater than in the pre-charge period.
After its incomplete consideration of the defendant's perspective, the Court in Lovasco
considered the perspectives of prosecutors and judges. From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is unacceptable
because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible by
causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. From the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because scarce
resources may be consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial or that involve only
some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts. Thus, the Court asserted, compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they are legally entitled to do so
would serve no one's interests. Id. at 791-92. The majority then went on for several pages
about the problems a contrary ruling would pose for prosecutors.
The majority's position is critiqued infra notes 284-92 and accompanying text. Despite
the flaws in the Court's reasoning, a prosecutor's perspective clearly dominates the opinion.
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Judges are probably better able to imagine the position of the former than the latter.2 60 Differential access, even if unconscious, to
the problems faced by various participants might affect the choice
of the lens through which to view a problem. Yet, in assessing the
breadth of constitutional rights designed to protect individuals
from harms inflicted by excessive state authority,2 61 the individual's perspective must hold center stage, even if this perspective is
tempered by consideration of competing perspectives.
Once again, wo can find a similar development in the effect/intent debate of antidiscrimination law. Rather than focus on the
victims of discrimination and the impact of various practices on
them (the effect analysis), the Burger Court focused on the alleged
discriminators and their motives (the intent analysis).262 If the perpetrators of a challenged practice did not intend to discriminate,
they bear no blame and should suffer no consequences. Those already suffering consequences, whose injuries exist regardless of
motive, have no remedy. Emphasis is placed on the fault of the
injurer as a precondition for relief, instead of the harm to the
injured.
Likewise, the pre-accusation delay cases focus on the blameworthiness of the prosecutor's conduct as a precondition for relief,
rather than on the defendant's injury. Professor Reiss has recently
argued that the focus on intent as a primary determinant of the
constitutionality of prosecutorial conduct undermines the systemic
values of consistency and predictability.2 6 An emphasis on
prosecutorial intent, he claims, produces such "ad hoc and confused" results that one is hard-pressed to call the results fair.26 4

260. After all, judges and prosecutors have been trained and socialized in a legal community and make their livelihood within it. Defendants, on the other hand, stand in opposition
to law. For insight into how problems of difference make it difficult for decisionmakers to
appreciate the legal claims of "others," see Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreward:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv, 10 (1987).
261. See, e.g., supra note 218 and accompanying text.
262. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination Law:
A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine,62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing that when the Supreme Court requires evidence of intentional discrimination, it is
adopting the perspective of defendant-perpetrators and rejecting the perspective of plaintiff-victims).
263. See Reiss, supra note 198, at 1368.
264. Id.
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Undermining the value of trustworthiness for generating criminal
convictions in our system, resulting in the imposition of the most
coercive of societal sanctions, places common 2understandings
of
65
jeopardy.
greater
even
in
fairness
of
notion
the
Instead of asking whether a prosecutor proceeded with good
faith dispatch in bringing formal charges, loyalty to due process
precedent requires that fairness analysis be conducted through a
defendant's eyes: What is the impact of delay on the accused's
ability to defend against the charges? If the accused demonstrates
a substantial level of delay-related prejudice, creating a reasonable
likelihood that it could affect the outcome, then under traditional
due process doctrine, the reasons for the delay are rendered irrelevant. Fact-finding integrity has already been compromised and the
trial cannot proceed fairly in these circumstances.

IV.

CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVES

Courts have had a number of doctrinal forms available to address the problem of delayed criminal charging: a speedy trial analysis, a compulsory process analysis and an authentic due process
test. Using the tools of conventional legal argument, one can make
a persuasive case that each of these analyses is preferable to that
chosen-an isolated analysis, mislabeled due process, that is uninformed by widely accepted due process principles. In fact, using
conventional legal arguments, one can make a persuasive case that
the alternative analyses are to be preferred in the order in which
they have been presented here.
Because delay in the criminal process is precisely the concern of
the speedy trial clause,2 6 the analysis that has emerged from its
interpretation presents the most appropriate framework for evaluating charging delay. A speedy trial approach provides a better analytic framework than a compulsory process approach because
speedy trial concerns coincide squarely, in a factual and legal
sense, with the concerns raised by charging delay. Compulsory process concerns-providing a fair opportunity for a defendant to
265. For a description of research indicating that satisfaction with adjudicatory proceedings relates less to outcome and more to notions of perceived procedural fairness, see generally E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
266. See supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
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bring in evidence to rebut criminal charges"-are broader than
the concerns raised by charging delay. Nevertheless, because the
fundamental problem with an extended period of charging delay is
the havoc it wreaks on the defendant's opportunity to gather and
present evidence in his or her behalf, compulsory process is also a
logically appropriate framework for analyzing the constitutional
impact of a delay-related loss of defense evidence. Due process,
which reaches many of the same concerns addressed by explicit
provisions of the Bill of Rights, is another appropriate framework
for analyzing the impact of charging delay in a criminal trial because due process is a broad guarantor of fairness in
adjudication.1

8

When alternative constitutional pegs on which to hang a rationale and decision are all logically suitable, many observers of the
legal process would recommend use of the narrowest.269 A specific
protection can atrophy if it is overlooked in favor of a broader
ground of decision. Use of a narrow constitutional ground clearly
identifies the interests at stake, refines the standards for assessing
those interests, illuminates the intended shades of meaning of the
particular language involved and develops guidance for deciding
subsequent cases.
Moreover, tying decisions to express constitutional language may
help protect these decisions as precedent and enhance their influential value for future decisions because many judges insist that
267. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 163, at 127 ("[W]herever a court can decide an issue on
one of two alternative provisions-one general, the other specific-its analysis should start
with the more specific."); cf. Clinton, supra note 3, at 793-94:
Since the specific guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments are designed
to resolve specific problems of criminal procedure, it would be more sensible to
ground the right to defend, especially insofar as the right must address new
obstacles to the accused not envisioned by the Framers, on concepts more general and flexible than the narrow and specific guarantees of the fifth and sixth
amendments.
Professor Charles Black, on the other hand, would find it unnecessary to tie the resolution

of issues to particular passages of constitutional text. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). His thesis is discussed more fully in Section VI,
infra.
270. See Westen, supra note 163, at 129 ("[T]o rely exclusively on the due process clause
in the face of other applicable and more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights is to render
the specific provisions mere surplusage.").
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constitutional jurisprudence depends on sound interpretations of
particular clauses of constitutional text, rather than on applications of nebulous general concepts such as "due process" to the
facts of particular cases." 1 These judges fear that general language
affords decisionmakers too much latitude to inject their subjective
preferences into the analytic mix when developing the ground for
decision. 2 Even if this belief is misguided, 273 to the extent that
judges hold it, case outcomes may be improved by relying on the
narrowest ground that applies logically as the basis of decision. 4
Hence, speedy trial analysis is preferable to compulsory process
analysis, which is preferable to a genuine due process analysis,
which is infinitely preferable to the faulty due process analysis that
now prevails in evaluating the impact of charging delay on criminal
proceedings.
If the courts had adopted a speedy trial analysis in pre-accusation delay cases, a showing of actual prejudice would not be a
threshold requirement, but a predominant factor in evaluating the

271. Justice Black was a leading proponent of this view, although he expresesed his opinion on the issue in the broader context of the incorporation debate. See, e.g., Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-76 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
272. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 614 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black J.,
concurring).
273. Notwithstanding the generality or specificity of doctrine, many commentators-legal
realists, critical theorists and feminist theorists among them-suggest that legal discourse
largely expresses the social and political judgments of decisionmakers, even if these judgments do not consciously shape their decisions. See, e.g., Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); D'Amato, Can Any Legal
Theory ConstrainAny Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 513 (1989); Minow, supra
note 260.
274. Support for this proposition comes from two cases cited by Westen, supra note 261,
at 127 n.72.
This is not a case in which the State has denied a defendant the benefit of a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights . . . . When specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that
prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them. But here the
claim is only that a prosecutor's remark . . . by itself so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.
Donnelley v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (citations omitted).
[A]part from trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a
constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and safeguards
are so relaxed or forgotten . . . that the proceeding is more a spectacle . . . or
trial by ordeal . . . than a disciplined contest.
United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1978) (citations omitted).
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strength of the claim, to be weighed with the length of the delay
and the reasons for the delay. If the courts had adopted a compulsory process approach in pre-accusation delay cases, the accused would prevail by showing that material evidence was missing
as a result of the delay and by advancing a plausible theory as to
how the missing evidence would have aided the defense. 6 Essentially, this is a requirement of actual prejudice, although less
strictly applied than the requirement of actual prejudice many
courts now use in the pre-accusation delay arena. 7 If the courts
had adopted a traditional due process approach in pre-accusation
delay cases, the accused would prevail upon a showing of prejudice
to the defense that jeopardizes the reliability of the guilt determination process.2 7 8 Once the defense makes such a showing, the reasons for the delay, no matter how laudatory, would be rendered
insufficient.
Fears concerning the dramatic increase in the dismissal of
charges that might follow the use of any of these approaches are
likely misplaced, given the paucity of dismissals and reversals of
conviction that presently follow from application of the various
standards in their respective contexts. 279 Each of the alternative
standards is still quite stringent. Unfortunately, none of these
analyses may be delicate enough to afford relief to the most deserving, those whose inability to make the requisite showing of
prejudice due to delay is directly related to the extent to which the

275. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The fourth factor evaluated in the
speedy trial balance-the accused's assertion of the right-will not be applicable in those
pre-accusation delay cases in which authorities gave the accused no indication prior to
charging that he or she was a suspect.
276. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 137, at 525.
In a quite literal sense, the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has today
become . . . more honored in the breach than the observance. Various institutional arrangements and forces at work within the criminal process have long
tended to convert the right of every criminal defendant to have a speedy trial
into a very different sort of right: the right of a few defendants, most egregiously denied a speedy trial, to have the criminal charges against them dismissed on that account.
Id. (citations omitted).
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delay has prejudiced them.8 0 Nevertheless, courts can appropriately insist upon a showing of prejudice because it provides the
only mechanism for distinguishing truly frivolous and unsupported
claims from those with merit.28 1 The key lies in adjusting the standard for the showing of prejudice to a level that includes most of
the cases in which prejudice has occurred and excludes most of
those in which the claim is baseless. The compulsory process standard, requiring a plausible theory of the potential benefit of missing evidence, is a good model of compromise between the needs of
law enforcement and the protection of defendants. The speedy
trial balancing test28 2 and the traditional due process standard2 83
represent similar compromises. The current test for analyzing preaccusation delay, however, is relatively uncompromising, elevating
law enforcement interests to a degree that diminishes the protection constitutional law has historically provided to defendants.
Can the speedy trial, compulsory process and traditional due
process standards be defended against the policy arguments so
prominent in the Lovasco opinion? In Lovasco, the majority worried that unless courts approved good faith investigative delay in
all circumstances, prosecutors would feel pressure to bring early

280. This conundrum is recognized in Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam) ("In a very real sense, the extent to which he was prejudiced is evidenced
by the difficulty he encountered in establishing with particularity the elements of that
prejudice.").
281. See e.g., United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
[U]nless the defendant can make some showing as to what the testimony
would have been, or specifically how the witness could have exonerated him,
there is no way of knowing whether the defendant is merely speculating as to
the contribution of the witness to his defense or perhaps even attempting to
take advantage of the witness's unavailability to make a Due Process claim
when it is in reality unfounded.
Id. at 677 n.12.
It is perhaps too cavalier for those unlikely to suffer criminal sanctions to advocate acceptance of a standard that assures that some persons, truly prejudiced by delay, may not
obtain relief. I acknowledge the inevitability of that result with sorrow. I would ask, however, for continual re-examination of the standard used for proof of actual prejudice to determine if it meets the goal of distinguishing most of the meritorious cases from most of the
frivolous cases. This determination, of course, is never more than a guess, but perpetually
examined guesses, revised when appropriate, are better than arbitrary and irrevocable
choices.
282. See supra note 138.
283. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions. 28 4 Early prosecutions, the Court asserted, can generate a number of problems, including unwarranted charging, partial
charging, loss of evidence that the prosecution would have had
available with a longer pre-charge investigation and preclusion of
decisions not to prosecute stemming from further investigation.2 8 5
These points would be well-taken if a focus on the level of defense prejudice amounted to a requirement of early charging when
the reason for delay was good faith investigation. Yet this would
hardly seem to be the case when a limited number of defendants,
not easily identified in advance, are likely to suffer such prejudice
as a result of delay. Nor, as the majority feared, would a focus on
defense prejudice instead of the good faith investigative reasons for
delay force courts to decide in every case when prosecutions should
have commenced, necessitating a reconstruction of the daily progress of each investigation.2 88 Courts would not need to decide
when prosecutions should have commenced, only whether a showing of delay-related prejudice to the defense rises to a sufficient
level to prevent fair and reliable fact-finding. Even when the motive for the prolonged investigation was to improve adversarial
fact-finding by assembling solid evidence prior to charging, if the
decision to delay actually impairs adversarial fact-finding by disabling an otherwise credible defense, constitutional principles require a remedy. In some cases, the only appropriate remedy may
be dismissal of the charges.28 7

284. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1977).
285. Id. at 792-94.
286. Id. at 793 n.14.
287. Of course, if steps short of dismissal can remedy the particular injury, dismissal
would be unnecessary. When possible, judges should contemplate remedies short of dismissal. For example, some prejudice might be mitigated by letting evidence of the delay and its
impact come before the jury. Judges might then consider relaxing rules of evidence (for
example, admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence when it is very likely corroborative of direct evidence that would have been available but for the delay); drafting jury instructions relating to the problem of delay (for example, instructing jurors that they may
draw an inference that evidence lost due to delay would have been favorable to the accused);
or allowing defense counsel to argue favorable inferences from evidence shown to have once
existed although it is now no longer available. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333, 338
(1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (prejudice to defendant avoided by defense attorney's summation regarding state's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and by jury
instruction that inference against state's interest was permitted from missing evidence).
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The Constitution dwindles in value when we perceive it as a
managerial document. True, constitutional interpretation may help
shape the structure of incentives that affect the behavior of public
officials. 88 Nevertheless, the role of the amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights is to shield individuals from excessive state
power, not to cast blame on officials who have behaved in ways
that can injure individuals. 89 Constitutional criminal procedure
guides decisions about whether actions taken in a particular case
have served the constitutional values of an adversary process or
undermined them. 9 This body of law provides a vehicle for assessing where the provable costs of even well-intentioned official
decisions, whether made implicitly or explicitly, should lie. 291 Requiring a prosecutor to forgo a prosecution need not be viewed as a

288. A common argument advanced in support of the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment jurisprudence is that it structures the incentives for police to abide by constitutional
precepts. Phrased in the negative, the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (citing
Eleutei v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 513, 141 A.2d 46, 50 (1958)).
289. See e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 341-42 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]t makes no sense to ignore the fact that a defendant has been denied a fair trial
because the State allowed evidence that was material to the defense to deteriorate beyond
the point of usefulness, simply because the police were inept rather than malicious."); see
also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutor's inadvertent failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence violates due process because the principle underlying due process cases
"is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused"); accord Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959) (prosecutor's knowing
use of perjured testimony is a due process violation because it prevented a fair trial, even
though prosecutor acted without "'guile or a desire to prejudice'" the defense.) (quoting
People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d 853, 855, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956)).
290. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (Court stated that ineffective assistance of counsel violated the sixth amendment when "the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.").
291. Charging delays are often within the control of police and prosecutors, and include
explicit decisions to continue investigations, to maintain an informant's undercover identity
for a longer period and to pursue leads against suspected accomplices. Professor Amsterdam
points out, however, that other seemingly unavoidable reasons for delay constitute implicit
decisions:
Offenses may not be immediately reported; investigation may not immediately
identify the offender; an identified offender may not be immediately apprehendable. When prosecution by indictment is required in a county that has
only a few short criminal terms of court per year, an indictment may be
delayed for weeks or even months until the impaneling of the next grand jury.
It is customary to think of these delays as natural and inevitable; to some extent they are; but various prosecutorial decisions-such as the assignment of

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:607

judicial sanction for executive misbehavior. Just as the law forbids
prosecution when an accused becomes incompetent to stand trial,
in part because of the risk of unreliability introduced by the accused's inability to assist defense counsel,29 2 so should the law forbid prosecution when delay prior to charging has had effects that
introduce the risk of unreliability in fact-finding. In the latter instance, the prosecutor is partially responsible for the prejudicial
effects, but in neither instance is the prosecutor at fault. Nonetheless, neither trial can proceed fairly.
In essence, the use of any of the alternative constitutional analyses described in Section III to protect against the harm of preaccusation delay is functionally similar to the creation of a doctrine of laches in criminal cases. Laches is an affirmative defense
that emerged from courts of equity, designed to prevent unfairness
in civil matters in which plaintiffs had delayed filing suit.2 93 The
approach many courts use in evaluating the laches issue is similar
to the speedy trial balancing test, weighing the length of delay, the
reasons for delay and the prejudice to the accused. 29 4 As is common in the pre-accusation delay cases, the kind of prejudice that
defendants often use to establish a laches defense is the loss of
pertinent testimonial or documentary evidence.2 95 If the laches defense succeeds, courts disallow the lawsuit.2 96 The constitutional
doctrine of pre-accusation delay, like the equitable doctrine of
laches, should strike a balance between competing interests in ser-

manpower and priorities among investigations of known offenses-may also affect the length of such delays.
Amsterdam, supra note 137, at 527-28 (citations omitted).
292. To be found competent, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [and have] a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). "[Clonviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (citing Bishop
v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956)).
293. See, e.g., In re Bohart, 743 F.2d 313, 326 (5th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982).
294. See, e.g., University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 104445 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982); J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§ 419(d) (5th ed. 1941).

295. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980); EEOC v.
Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978).
296. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d at 853.
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vice of broad conceptions of fairness in adversarial proceedings.297
In fact, courts must be at least as solicitous of fairness in criminal
proceedings as they are of fairness in civil proceedings, given the
gravity of the interests at stake in criminal litigation.298
V.

THE DYNAMICS OF ABANDONED ANALOGIES

A. Evaluating the Abandonment
Although not endorsed by any court, the foregoing analyses ap-

plied to pre-accusation delay are of a venerable sort, entirely
within the bounds of conventional legal discourse. Oddly, when
confronted with the problem of pre-accusation delay, the Supreme
Court selected the least sound of conventional alternatives for analyzing the problem, as measured by standards of mainstream jurisprudential thought. Therefore, the Court's choice merits examination and requires explanation. Why were formal legal categories
not applied in the way that conventions of doctrine and precedent
would have predicted? What light is shed by the jurisprudence of
pre-accusation delay on the true processes of legal reasoning?
If, as is traditionally expressed, the predominant style of legal
reasoning is analogical, 299 then the law of pre-accusation delay is

exceptional. Rather than acknowledging obvious "family resemblances"300 among various categories of doctrine, judicial decisionmakers appear to have proceeded in opposite fashion. Ignoring
297. See, e.g., United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 681 (9th Cir. 1977):
Pre-indictment delays, of course, have always generated particularly sensitive
judicial problems requiring careful accommodations between the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the constitutionally protected interest of
an accused in the fairness and reliability of the judicial process.
298. See supra note 254.
299. Edward Levi termed it "reasoning by example" or the "persuasion of similar situations." See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1, vii (1949); see also S. BURTON,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 9 (1985). Although some commentators
characterize legal reasoning as having a deductive form, I will not address deductive reasoning processes in this Article, primarily because the analogical and deductive categories of
legal reasoning overlap so extensively. Reasoning from the language of a rule or text is informed by the manner in which others have reasoned from the same or similar language in
analogous situations. For a more comprehensive description of the interrelationship of analogical and deductive reasoning, see id. at 59-82.
300. The source of the equation of analogous cases to similarities among members of a
family seems to be L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65-76 (G. Anscombe
trans. 1958). Many legal commentators speak of family resemblances among analogous
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striking similarities, 3 1 they have emphasized slender differences
between these categories.
Is this observation so oversimplified as to be overstated? Perhaps judges found simply that differences superseded the resemblances of pre-charge delay to other areas of law. Perhaps judges
found the distinctions between pre-charge delay and speedy trial,
compulsory process and due process so compelling as to recommend a discrete approach to the problem of dilatory charging. If
this response has validity, then the critique of the use of analogical
reasoning processes in the pre-accusation delay cases is blunted.
Although theoretically possible, this justification appears untenable, especially with respect to the speedy trial analogy. The
problems of pre-charge and post-charge delay are virtually identical in their underlying facts and principles, both involving a period
of government inaction that potentially impairs the presentation of
evidence, particularly defense evidence, at trial. Forging an analogy
between the two areas demands no intellectual leap. Common
sense, in combination with legal sense, requires a powerful explanation before treating them differently.
Between pre-charge and post-charge delay, there is, of course,
one factual distinction of potential moment-when the delay occurred-and we must examine what difference that distinction
makes. The only way to determine the legal implications of the
factual distinction is to evaluate it in light of the purposes of
speedy trial law.30 2 Although speedy trial doctrine is also designed
to protect defendants from oppressive pre-trial anxiety and incarceration while awaiting trial, the primary concern of speedy trial
doctrine-to protect the fact-finding process from the deteriora-

cases. See S. BURTON, supra note 297, at 85-99; Feinman, The Jurisprudenceof Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 678 (1989).
301. One definition of the word "analogy" is "resemblance in some particulars between
things otherwise unlike." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 82 (1986).
302. The notion that, when considering an analogy, one can evaluate resemblances and
distinctions only in light of the purposes of the underlying category comes from H. HART.
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961): "[U]ntil it is established what resemblances and differences are relevant, 'Treat like cases alike' must remain an empty form. To fill it we must
know when, for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what differences
are relevant." Id. (emphasis added).
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tion of delay-is
also the primary concern of pre-accusation delay
30 3
analysis.
One of the purposes of pre-accusation delay is inapplicable to
the speedy trial context: enhancing fact-gathering by permitting
the prosecutor to conduct more thorough investigations. In other
words, one purpose of permitting extended pre-accusation delay is
to improve the fact-finding process. Nevertheless, well-intentioned
prosecution efforts to improve fact-finding can actually work to undermine fact-gathering efforts by the defense. If, despite the best
of intentions, delay impairs the overall fact-finding process, the
primary difficulties engendered.by pre-charge and post-charge delay become interchangeable. When the victims of each form of delay find themselves in much the same straits, the distinguishing
features between these forms become trivial. In these circumstances, the speedy trial issue and the pre-accusation delay issue
are functionally equivalent and their legal analysis should be
equivalent as well.
Compulsory process and due process cases do not have as close a
factual connection to charging delay as do speedy trial cases; therefore, their analogical link may not be as apparent. But by capturing the facts and concerns of compulsory process and due process
in language of a higher level of generality, we can make the analogical relationship evident. As described in Section IIIB, compulsory
process cases are concerned with actions by the government that
diminish a defendant's opportunity to present evidence on his or
her behalf. 04 As described in Section IIIC, due process cases are
concerned with government actions that undermine the fundamental fairness and reliability of adjudicatory proceedings.305 Each
general description subsumes the underlying concern charging delay raises. Hence, all of these cases are variations on a theme. They
overlap considerably, their boundaries blurred. They are all alike
in broad aspects, in the essential animating principles that underlie each category of cases. In comparison with these animating
principles, the factual differences that give each category a separate name appear trifling. A purely applied analogical reasoning

303. See supra notes 126-34, and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
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process conducted according to conventional legal understandings
should have recognized the resemblances. By isolating the analysis
of charging delay, evaluating it by a test all its own, the courts
have turned the analogical reasoning process on its head.
B. The Role of Consistency
The legal system claims legitimacy, at least in part, on the basis
of its logical infrastructure-its analytic mechanisms for finding
similarities in legally similar cases, finding differences in legally
different cases, then treating these cases accordingly. In a system
of logical categorization, legitimacy depends on consistent application of the system's internal rules.306 When this logical ordering
breaks down, as with the issue of charging delay, in which markedly similar cases are treated as though they are entirely unrelated,
the need for internal consistency is frustrated.
Because few contemporary thinkers insist upon or desire purity
in doctrinal classification, 0 7 internal inconsistencies in the application of doctrine need not generate alarm about institutional integrity as long as the doctrinal decisionmaking is consistent with, and
justified by, some external principle or policy that, at some level of
agreement, society considers valuable to pursue.308 With respect to
cases of pre-accusation delay, courts have not articulated an external principle to explain or justify the internal inconsistency of the
doctrine. Unless we can derive a legitimating principle from the
context, the decisions in this area render the legal process vulnerable to challenges to its authority.
Can external policies explain the courts' decisions regarding
charging delay, even if courts have not articulated the policies in so
many words? In seeking to answer this question, we must remem306. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 300, at 676.

307. For exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF
(1981); Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT.

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
REV. 85.

308. This is essentially the perspective of post-realist legal theorists, who locate legal
decisionmaking in the center of a continuum ranging from formal rigidity to unconstrained
choice. Foremost among these theorists are Edward Levi and Karl Llewellyn, who assert
that working through problems within an established legal tradition constrains decisionmaking. Nevertheless, they acknowledge the need to make policy choices in reaching these decisions. See generally E. LEVI, supra note 299; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION,
DECIDING APPEALS

(1960); Feinman, supra note 300, at 676.
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ber that since the Supreme Court framed its weak imitation of a
due process analysis for addressing problems of charging delay, an
overwhelming majority of cases have found no due process violation inhering in an extended period of pre-charge delay.3 0 9 Clearly,
the choice of doctrinal forms has had a profound influence on the
substantive outcomes of cases.
This pattern of results was likely to have been both foreseen and
intended. Perhaps this pattern explains the court's doctrinal choice
in the charging delay cases. Whenever a court crafts a procedural
rule in a criminal case, it always has available at least two competing social visions from which to draw its external justification: a
crime control vision and an individual protection vision. 10 In-

309. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
310. Characterization of the crime control/due process dichotomy is generally attributed
to H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), in which the author describes
the "value choices that underlie the details of the criminal process." Id. at 153. Labeling
these visions "models," Packer asserts that the "Crime Control Model" is "based on the
proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to
be performed by the criminal process." Id. at 158. The individual protection vision, which
Packer calls the "Due Process Model," is based on "the concept of the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of limitation on official power." Id. at 165.
John Griffiths has written an astute critique of Packer's work. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970). Griffiths claims that Packer has given us not two competing perspectives, but one: an ideology
of an irreconcilable disharmony of interests between the state and the accused-a "Battle
Model"-in which the only relevant variable is the balance of advantage between them. Id.
at 367-71. To illustrate his point, Griffiths sketches an alternative view, based on an assumption of reconcilable interests between the state and the accused: a "Family Model" of
the criminal process, named for an institution that sometimes inflicts punishment, but is
premised on the idea of the harmony of interests of its members. Id. at 371-73. Griffiths
then describes the fundamental changes that might be wrought by such a radical shift in the
substantive premise of the criminal process. Id. at 373-94.
I agree with Griffiths that one cannot truly understand procedure without reference to
substantive premises and outcomes. I also agree that the crime control vision and the due
process vision share a belief in the irreconcilability of interests between the state and the
accused. Nor do they exhaust the universe of possibilities with respect to imagining a system
of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, as Griffiths ably demonstrates, our system of criminal
procedure is built on an ideology of irreconcilable interests between the state and the accused, the Battle Model ideology, such that all procedural judgments are filtered through
questions of balance of advantage. Although this ideology is historically contingent, not inevitable, we so unconsciously accept it in contemporary America that understanding the
present context means understanding that ideology, and reforming the present context
ieans starting from that premise as well. Stepping outside the ideological premises of our
cultural system, while extradordinarily enlightening, is not the approach to adopt when, as

672

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:607

formed by these visions, the rule the court crafts serves to allocate
power between the state and the defendant. " '
Commentators have noted that the adversarial process of criminal adjudication operates to provide an extraordinary power imbalance in favor of the prosecution. 12 Rather than seeking to remedy
that imbalance with a compensatory procedural rule, to put the
prosecution and defense on more level terrain, the Court chose, in
these circumstances, to endorse the prevailing distribution of
power. It chose to privilege the procedures recommended by crime
control imagery and to suppress, except in aberrant cases, the imagery of protecting individuals from excessive state power.
With respect to some issues of criminal procedure, a crime control vision may supply an external policy justification that legitimately helps shape the doctrinal decisionmaking process. When
choosing, for example, the procedures by which police may elicit
confessions, or the procedures that police must follow in conducting searches and seizures, we should weigh the needs of law
enforcement directly against the needs of individual protection
from certain kinds of official excess. When, however, the type of
official excess involved may bear directly on the judgment of criminal culpability, we cannot trade off the quality and reliability of
that judgment in favor of the powerful imagery of crime control
and the real needs of law enforcement.3' 3 These needs and images
here, the goal is to persuade decisionmakers about the value of reforms that they can implement within the present cultural context.
311. See Griffiths, supra note 310, at 367-68:
Since one or the other party to a process for settling disputes between irreconcilables must win in every case, the crucial question for criminal procedure so
conceived is what bias to build into the rules. This is where Packer's Models
differ. The Crime Control Model reflects a primary concern with the threat
which individuals pose to the general social order and welfare; accordingly, it is
designed to protect society by favoring it as much as possible through the rules
of battle. The Due Process Model represents the alternative reaction to the
assumed state of irreconcilability-an inclination to offset state power in the
battle by providing rules as favorable as possible to an accused.
312. See generally Goldstein, supra note 26 (providing abundant support, through procedural examples, for the proposition that institutional arrangements in the criminal process
aggravate the prosecution's disproportionate advantage).
313. See P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 135 (1958):
When a criminal goes free, it is as much a failure of abstract justice as when an
innocent man is convicted ....
[B]ut an injustice on the one side is spread over
the whole of society and an injustice on the other is concentrated in the suffer-
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have limited force when the processes for adjudicating guilt are
rendered untrustworthy; crime control and law enforcement are
served by unreliable criminal convictions only in the minds of the
most cynical. Because a legal system cannot espouse such cynicism
in support of its claim to authority, the crime control perspective
does not provide a legitimate external principle or policy to justify
its doctrinal choice in cases of pre-accusation delay. This perspective may well have influenced the decisions-indeed, no other easily discernible justification presents itself-but it is unspeakable in
a system that also espouses fundamental procedural fairness in
3 14
criminal proceedings.

Lacking internal consistency with the legal system's rules, and
lacking a legitimate external justification for the inconsistencies,
the jurisprudence of pre-accusation delay appears to have no principled defense. It stands as an example of judicial failure to use
analogical reasoning processes to respond to procedural problems
when thwarted, as likely happened here, by a particular policy justification. That the courts left the external justification unarticulated is hardly startling. As stated above, it was essentially unarticulable due to its contradiction of other widely shared norms,
such as the need for a high level of accuracy in criminal convictions
as an elemental feature of procedural fairness215

ing of one man.... Since we know that the ascertainment of guilt cannot be
made infallible and that we must leave room for a margin of error, we should
take care to see that as far as humanly possible the margin is all on the side of
the defense.
See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62-65 (1957), in which the Supreme Court
distinguished between procedures that courts must follow when guilt or innocence is at
stake and procedures that they must follow when constitutional or other rights are at stake.
Because the former is the overriding concern of criminal procedure, courts must realize
higher standards in that context and make procedural accommodations. In Roviaro, the
Court compelled the prosecution to disclose the identity of a confidential informant when
the informant had information bearing directly on guilt or innocence. Id. at 61-62. The
Court found law enforcement needs less weighty than the need for a reliable judgment of
criminal culpability. Id. at 62-64.
314. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 1192 ("If a procedural system is to be fair and just,
it must give each of the participants in the dispute the opportunity to sustain his
position.").
315. See J. FaANK, supra note 19, at 35, who wrote of the problem of mistaken fact-finding in criminal cases:
[A] defense of grave miscarriages of justice is legitimate only if they are inevitable-that is, only if everything practical has been done to avoid such injus-
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EXPANDING ANALOGICAL REASONING

One response to the abandonment of analogical reasoning in the
pre-accusation delay cases is to urge that the doctrinal "mistake"
be corrected, that the analysis of pre-indictment delay be incorporated into a speedy trial analysis or, as secondary and tertiary
choices, into a compulsory process analysis or a genuine due process analysis. But given the ease with which courts avoided categorical analogies, in likely service of an unstated external objective,
it might be valuable to step outside the structure of categorical
thinking to speculate about new ways to use traditional analogical
reasoning processes.
The world is ingeniously inventive about furnishing complex and
varied factual circumstances that give rise to legal issues. From
3 16
such complexity arises the allure of fixed categories of thought.
Defining the judicial role as assigning a problem to an appropriate
category reduces the need to explore the problem in all its facets.
Instead, the problem sheds its complicated features when put into
a simplifying category. Placement in the category, not the initial
problem, triggers a particular reasoning process, and that reasoning process, once set in motion, ultimately determines the appropriate legal response. Even if the doctrinal classification does not
respond fully and sensitively to the problem presented, at least it
produces a decision for which no decisionmaker must assume definitive responsibility. If a just outcome obtains, it might be simply
an artifact of this convoluted process. Worse, unjust outcomes
might hide behind the guise of this routine classification process. 17
318
Why make important judgments through such indirection?
tices ....
Perfect justice lies beyond human reach. But the unattainability of
the ideal is no excuse for shirking the effort to obtain the best available.
316. See Minow, supra note 260, at 90.
317. The essential relationship between substantive ideals and various styles and uses of
legal doctrine is a central feature of critical theory. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (describing the relationship of
arguments about use of rules to substantive social visions); Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 616-46 (1983) (describing the manner in which contract
doctrine masks the conflicting social visions that underlie it).
318. Griffiths, supra note 310, at 378, phrases the question somewhat differently. He also
hints at an answer, although clearly he finds it inadequate:
Why all of this kind of effort to fix the limits of the "criminal" process with a
priori categorical limits for which no one has ever found a really persuasive
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If we broaden our understanding of analogical reasoning, we may
discover more direct approaches to legal decisionmaking. One approach, for example, might involve reasoning by analogy to societal
norms. Through this method, judges would immerse themselves in
the particularities of a dispute, as described by the parties before
them, and tailor a resolution explicitly and directly reasoned, by
analogizing to the conditions required by the broad substantive
commitments of society 3 1 9 When these substantive commitments
are embodied in particular cases, this method of reasoning will
converge with more traditional analogical reasoning methods. The
resolution derived by reasoning from societal norms might be a
matter of debate, but so too are the categorical resolutions of
problems. At least, with respect to direct decisionmaking, we could
focus debate squarely on the interests at stake. The alternative,
allowing occasions to arise when the interests at stake seep into the
categorical decisionmaking process and corrupt its implementation
without acknowledgment, is both less honest and less trustworthy.
At least through the suggested approach, judges would be properly
attuned to the fact that they, not doctrines, make decisions. Judicial accountability for decisions, through an explicit reasoning process, would be required and biases would be more likely to be exposed and confronted.
Reasoning by analogy to societal norms might be called a harmbased approach to analogical reasoning, if it is not so far removed
from traditional understandings of analogical reasoning to be so
denominated. Rather than deciding which doctrinal category the
problem represented, a judge faced with an issue of pre-accusation
delay might explore, with the help of the parties, the myriad ways

function, except that it is a battleground which we want kept as limited as
possible and whose boundaries we need to maintain by constant patrolling?

Id.
319. See generally Minow, supra note 260.
"We reflect on an incident not by subsuming it under a general rule, not by
assimilating its features to the terms of an elegant scientific procedure, but by
burrowing down into the depths of the particular, finding images and connec"
tions that will permit us to see it more truly, describe it more richly ....
Id. at 91 (quoting M. NusSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LuCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 69 (1986)).
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982)

systems of rules).

Other feminist theorists would concur. See, e.g., C.
(exploring reasoning processes that do not depend on
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in which charging delay is alleged to have harmed the defendant
and analyze whether these harms represent the kinds of impediments to a fair fact-finding process that societal norms will not allow. This approach focuses directly and carefully on the primary
interests at issue: the injury to the defendant's case and the integrity of the subsequent trial. If, after examining the detail and documentation of the allegations, a judge finds credible a claim that
important evidence would have been available but for the delay,
and finds also that the delay has damaged fact-finding beyond repair, then, in the name of the substantive commitment to fair procedure, the judge may dismiss the charges or take any other action
she deems responsive to the problem. 20
The harm-based approach is not free from potential deceits: A
judge consciously or unconsciously might still make unwarranted
findings in order to accomplish unstated goals, a risk only partially
addressed by mandating a full description and evaluation of the
evidence. But at least the decision would be more expressly about
what made the dispute matter. Decisionmakers would not be diverted into discussions of the breadth of various classifications,
and would not be able to place responsibility for a decision on the
doctrinal categories themselves. A judge would move between the
details of a case and a substantive commitment to fairness in proceedings, and then make a decision applying the latter to the former, without asking doctrine to stand as intermediary.
This approach has other potential advantages as well, opening
up a broader range of information than we might deem relevant to
decision by doctrinal category. For example, comparative criminal
procedure could become a more significant source of instruction if
the decisionmaking process becomes more flexible and open ended.
Examining other societies' norms by turning to comparative
sources might prove valuable in expanding the decisionmakers' vision. The law of pre-accusation delay is an excellent example, one
in which examining the continental practice of judicial supervision
of the investigatory phase of criminal cases might prove a profitable inquiry.3 21 By what principles do continental judges decide to

320. For consideration of other remedies short of dismissal, see supra note 287.

321. See, e.g., R.

SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW

441-43 (4th ed. 1980) (describing the

practice in countries in which the pretrial investigation is conducted by a judge-known as
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delay charging and protract an investigation? Exploring continental practice might help courts derive a workable set of rules that
prevent the unnecessary harms of charging delay by guiding conscientious prosecutors in the timing of charging. 2 2 This possibility
is much less likely under the current model of decisionmaking, unless a niche is found within doctrinal categories that makes such
information germane.
In his small book Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law,3 2 Professor Charles Black has also advocated a more
straightforward approach to judicial decision.3 24 Asking where we
would be if the framers had never inserted the due process clause
into the Constitution, he suggests that the prospect would not be
as bleak as we might first imagine. As a society, our substantive
commitment to protection of individuals against state power is enshrined in the due process clause, but the commitment persists regardless of the language or the inclusion of the specific phrase in
the constitutional text.3 25 In fact, Professor Black's thesis is that
we can infer the commitment without reference to the due process
clause, by reasoning from the relationships created by the logic of
3 26
our constitutional structure itself.

the juge d'instruction in France); see also L. wEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 119-37 (1977)
(arguing for the establishment of an investigating magistracy in the United States, an argument derived from the French model). In many continental systems, prosecutorial discretion
is much narrower than in the United States. Id.; see Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1974) (discussing the merits of the
prosecutorial function in Germany compared to the United States). These examples may
provide insights worthy of consideration in reforming our own system.
322. The furor generated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), indicates that many commentators view the formulation of prophylatic rules to
guide public officials as an excessive and illegitimate use of judicial authority. See, e.g.,
Grano, Prophylatic Rules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80
Nw. U.L. REv. 100 (1985) (discussing the appropriate identification of prophylactic rules and
the legitimacy of such rules). Although mindful of this critique, I believe that courts, by
virtue of their responsibility to translate the fundamental commitments of society into resolutions of specific problems, can appropriately provide guidance to public officials as to how
to conform their behavior to those fundamental commitments.
323. C.

BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUT1ONAL LAW

(1969).

324. As Professor Black has been heard to say, in Texas twang, "No idea worth its salt
can't be said in under 100 pages." (statement made during course entitled "Constitutional
Law Revisited," Yale Law School, spring term 1981).
325. C. BLACK, supra note 323, at 33-34, 65-66.
326. Id. at 7.
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Professor Black suggests that the procedural protections now
linked to the language of procedural due process are best seen as
arising from our government's organizing principle of ordered liberty and from the status of citizenship in a nation organized in
such a fashion. 2 7 The right to a fair trial and other refrains in the
field of criminal procedure "would seem to be the least possible
domestic implication of the conferral of citizenship .
*..,2
Surely, Professor Black states, our precious freedoms have a
deeper foundation in our political system and in our guaranteed
enjoyment of citizenship than that the words of the fourteenth
3 29
amendment commanded them.
Professor Black's objection to reasoning from textual categories
is that in some cases "it forces us to blur the focus and talk evasively, while the structural method frees us to talk sense. ' 33 0 His
conclusion is only this:
All I am suggesting is that a method not unknown in our constitutional law be brought more clearly into the conscious field
of those who work in that law. I make this suggestion in the
faith, fundamentally, that clarity about what we are doing,
about the true or the truly acceptable grounds of judgment, is
both a good in itself, and a means to sounder decision.... 31
And I should hope that when some emergent problem might
be solved by these means, we may show at least enough methodological flexibility to take a long look at this way to solution.32
Professor Black's constitutional perspective offers support for an
expanded understanding of analogical reasoning processes. The approach that I suggest here does not exhaust the full spectrum of
possibilities for enlarging our view of analogical reasoning beyond
categorical uses, but is intended to generate further thinking about
such possibilities. When viewed closely, the harm-based approach
represents a modest reform, recommending merely that courts reason more directly about issues that a focus on doctrinal categories
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 62-63.
at 62.
at 13.
at 31-32.
at 66.
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often allows courts to avoid. But if, as is likely in the foreseeable
future, our legal culture remains wedded to doctrinal categories,
then the least we can do is challenge their faulty and erroneous
uses.
VII. CONCLUSION

The problems posed by the languid pace of American criminal
justice argue for the development of procedures to expedite the
processing of criminal cases. Tinkering with the case law of preaccusation delay is less likely to promote this goal than other institutional modifications. 333 Nevertheless, because the Constitution
does provide some protection to defendants from the hazards of
charging delay, constitutional criminal law should be responsive to
the harms that such delay can create. This Article has sought to
demonstrate that the current body of law is poorly suited to that
task.
Moreover, the law of charging delay defies mainstream understandings of analogical reasoning processes. Had legal reasoning
operated as advertised, we would likely analyze charging delay as a
speedy trial problem, or less preferably but still appropriately, as a
compulsory process problem or a true due process problem, because each is analogous to charging delay in legally significant
ways. Any of these doctrinal choices represents a sounder analysis
of the underlying issues than the analysis the Supreme Court specially fashioned.
The abandonment of analogical reasoning in this situation is
likely explained by psychological pressures derived from the decisionmakers' awareness of the need for crime control, although
crime control needs are not well-served by sacrificing individual
protections in these circumstances. Moreover, institutional integ333. Professor Amsterdam's partial list of such institutional modifications includes:
improved deployment of the available resources of the courts, prosecutors' offices, public defenders' offices, police departments, and probation departments;
considerable additions to all of these resources; considerable increases in the
numbers of private practitioners willing and able to handle criminal cases, and
of criminal-law paraprofessionals; and considerable diminution of the vast
mass of largely wasteful intake that now impedes the capacity of the system to
function effectively.
Amsterdam, supra note 137, at 525-26.
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rity is undermined by inconsistency in the application of the internal logical rules of the legal system. Given the facility with which
courts sidestepped such rules in the instant context, we should explore a less categorical and more straightforward approach to addressing the harms of pre-accusation delay. I have suggested one
approach, a harm-based approach involving reasoning by analogy
to societal norms, in the hope that it can stimulate thinking about
improved methods of legal analysis. Until expansive approaches to
analogical reasoning become more fashionable, analytic inconsistencies that threaten the legitimacy of the legal process should be
highlighted and their damage repaired. In the meantime, some
number of accused persons will continue to lose their liberties, potentially even their lives, when, after the ravages of time's passing,
they are convicted at trials that cannot be trusted.

